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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this Dissertation is to philosophically critique
three approaches to explicating the nature of moral judgments. 1 The
three approaches are formalism, the content approach (brands of consequentialism, for instance) and virtue ethics,
philosophically defensible model

and then

to develop a

of moral judgment making using input

from various ethical views discussed in the Dissertation.

In

reviewing

the literature, including Dissertation Abstracts, there was not a single
work found which dealt with the precise issue of this Dissertation.
There are a number of works which consider single aspects of the
issue of the nature of moral judgments -- or which elucidate a particular approach to the issue.

But no single work was found which

sophically explicated and analyzed the

philo-

positions of formalism, the

content approach and virtue ethics collectively -- not to mention a work
which attempts

to develop an "integrated model" of moral judgment mak-

ing, which will be the focus of Chapter Five.
1The term 11 moral 11 is being used because many of the writers we
will be examining use 11 moral 11 rather than 11 ethical. 11 We will be using
the terms 11 moral 11 and "ethical" interchangeably -- fully realizing the
philosophical difficulties in such a move.
1

2

Regarding

Hare's

brand of formalism, it will be argued that his

notion of prescriptivity as one characteristic of a moral
philosophically problematic.

judgment is

For instance, merely because an utterance

is prescriptive it does not follow that one is capable of fulfilling
it. 2 Commands obviously have many purposes and to reduce them to one
type, prescriptive, is philosophical reductionism at its worst.
The best that Hare could argue, then, is that SOME value judgments
entail

imperatives.

Imperatives may guide conduct, but not choice.

insisting that imperatives guide moral choices
fundamental

Hare fails

By

to make a

and necessary distinction, namely that between choice and

conduct.
There are also philosophical difficulties with

Hare's contention

that universalizability is a second characteristic of a moral judgment.
Universalizability does not separate moral judgments from other normative judgments, for instance.

Universalizability could be a character-

istic of aesthetic judgments, say.

There is no basis for distinguishing

a moral judgment from other judgments simply by positing the universalizability characteristic for which Hare argues.
Lawrence Kohlberg is a formalist because he likewise uses

universalizability as one defining characteristic of a moral judgment. 3
2

R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1963), p. 51.
3Kohlberg 1 s position is found in various articles in his Essays on
Moral Develo ment: Vol. 1, The Philoso h of Moral Develo ment.
(New
York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1981 .

3

The same criticisms of Hare's attempt at this move apply
But

to

Kohlberg.

Kohlberg goes beyond Hare in that Kohlberg sees no place for habit

as an aspect of moral judgment making.

Not that

Hare does.

It

is

merely the case that Kohlberg's theory is a mixture of a formalist and a
content theory.

But, as will be argued in some depth, Kohlberg's model

of habit is quite behavioristic and certainly not within the philosophical tradition.

William Frankena and John Dewey have a more

philosophi-

cally appropriate concept of habit -- so it will be argued. 4
It has

been a philosophical commonplace that motivation is inte-

gral to moral judgment making.
judgment-making process.

And "affect" is one aspect of the moral

Kohlberg, with

cognitive approach to moral judgment making,
integrate these various

his

highly

makes

rationalistic,

little attempt to

processes in moral judgment making and, thus,

his theory of moral judgment making is deficient for this reason alone.
Finally, like Plato before him, Kohlberg argues that there

is an

essential connection between knowledge and virtue, that is, if one knows
the moral thing to do, she will do it. 5 We will take Kohlberg to task
regarding this aspect of his theory.
4see, William K. Frankena, Three Historical Philoso hies of Education. (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1965 and John
Dewey, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics. (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1891).
5Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of
the Platonic View, 11 Moral Education: Five Lectures, Ed. T.Sizer.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

4

The content approach will be represented by Kurt Baier and Stephen
Toulmin.

Baier argues that it is "the moral point of view" which is the

defining characteristic of a moral judgment -- in fact, "the moral point
of view 11 determines if a moral judgment is true or false. 6 One can
always retort, though, that following "the moral point of view"
problematic when following

it violates one's self-interest.

becomes
One won-

ders, then, if "the moral point of view" is a point of view which
ACTUALLY

is

held by anyone at all or if it is really the case that all

Baier is saying is that "the moral point of view 11 is a view which OUGHT
to be actually held.
Stephen

Toulmin,

on the other hand, argues that 11 good reasons 11
supply the content aspect of moral judgments. 7 But, similar to Baier,
Toulmin never lets the reader know if "good reasons" are justifications
for saying 11 X is a proper moral judgment 11 or "X ought to be done. 11 Yet,
Toulmin is more of a consequentialist than Baier. 8 In fact, for moral
judgments which are not unequivocal (promise keeping, for example),
is the consequences which define

11

X being a proper moral judgment. 11

the basic consequence Toulmin argues for is

11

it
And

community harmonization. 119

6Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View.
(Ithaca, NY:
Cornell
University Press, 1958).
7stephen Toulmin, The Place of Reason in Ethics.
(Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1950).
8 Ibid., p. 134.
9Ibid., p. 133 and p. 136.

5

But for such an argument to be sound Toulmin would need to show that the
principle that community harmonization is THE basic morally acceptable
consequence of moral judgment making is itself a part of the community's
moral

code.

question.

But it can't be, for to be so Toulmin would be begging the

For these reasons, among others,

the content approach to

defining the characteristics of moral judgments is wanting.
Perhaps, though, the virtue ethics approach will fare better.

Ac-

cording to Macintyre it is the "narrative unity of a human life" which
is the criterion of a 11 true 11 moral judgment. 10 But one's life could be
unified by such a narrative and the person still be a lost soul.
wise,

Like-

many people, such as Hitler, lived a life in which his narrative

unity seemed to be accomplished.

We disagree, of course, about how that

unity was apparently accomplished.
James

Wallace also uses the criterion of community harmonization
as a basic defining characteristic of moral judgment making. 11 But, as
we shall argue, what he has in mind as representing that community harmonization is
following

strictly following

social

convention.

And certainly

social convention sometimes may not be the moral thing to do.

For these reasons, among others, virtue ethics has
lems of its

own which militate against

philosophical

prob-

it being THE candidate for

explaining the nature of moral judgments.

lOAlasdair Macintyre, After Virtue.
(Notre Dame,
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 203.
11 James Wallace,
Virtues and Vices.
(Ithaca, NY:
University Press, 1978), p. 33.

Indiana:
Cornell

6

What will be attempted, then, based upon the work of Tom
Beauchamp, 12 will be to develop an "integrative model" of moral judgment
making which uses elements from the three theories philosophically examined

in this Dissertation, among others.

The rationale for such a move

will be explicated and such a model proposed, supplied with
cal

justification.

At times,

then,

philosophi-

universalizability (a formalist

criterion) might be a proper criterion for defining a moral

judgment,

while at other times an examination of the proposed consequences (a
content aspect) might do the job.
The Dissertation will be divided into the following chapters:
Chapter One:

The Problem

This chapter has presently set the problem in philosophical perspective.
There

has been an attempt here to also review the important literature,

and to develop the modus operandi for the rest of the Dissertation.
Chapter Two:

The Fonnalist Approach

This chapter will explicate, examine and philosophically analyze the
work of R.

M. Hare and Lawrence Kohlberg -- with a view toward demon-

strating philosophical difficulties with their respective positions.
Chapter Three:

The Content Approach

This chapter will examine and philosophically critique the theories of
Kurt Baier and Stephen Toulmin regarding their content approaches to
12 Tom Beauchamp develops his concept of "integration" in several
places. Perhaps his most systematic attempt is in "What's So Special
About the Virtues?", Virtue and Medicine: Ex lorations in the Character
of Medicine, ed. Earl Shelp Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1985 ,
pp. 307-327.

7

adequate criteria of moral judgment making.

Some comparisons and con-

trasts will be made with the formalist approach.
Chapter Four:

The Virtue Ethics Approach

This chapter will likewise explicate and

philosophically examine the

theories of the proper criteria of moral judgment making of Alasdair
Macintyre and James Wallace -- with Philippa Foot and

Bernard Williams

as the basis for contrasting theories.
Chapter Five:

This

Models of Moral Judgment Making

chapter will

take elements from the three approaches previously

examined, among other insights regarding the nature of moral
and attempt to develop a more

judgments,

"integrated model" of moral judgment

making -- a model which is philosophically argued for.

The work of Tom

Beauchamp will serve as a basis for this model.
Chapter Six:

With

Su111T1ary and Conclusion

this agenda

in mind, then, let us begin our philosophical

trek through the wilderness of moral judgments, that is, let us begin to
examine theories

regarding

the characteristics and criteria which are

thought to make a judgment moral.

CHAPTER II
THE FORMALIST APPROACH
Philosophers do not agree regarding the characterization of moral
judgments.
ments

But in the main they seem content to agree that moral

are an outcome of normative inquiry.

suggest otherwise.
moral

judg-

Indeed it would be odd to

The problem is not with someone who asserts

judgment is a form of non-normative inquiry.

issue is definitional (i.e., the philosophical
moral judgments as a form of normative inquiry).

that a

At this point the

tradition

has defined

The issue is peculiar-

ly philosophical, that is, a psychologist might consider moral judgments
to be a form of non-normative inquiry -- of objective, scientific inquiry, perhaps.
though,

is

The crux of the argumentation for

the philosopher,

to develop criteria for an activity to be characterized as

normative inquiry.

One way to do this is to make certain sorts of dis-

tinctions.
Moral

judgments are

thought to be responding to questions about

what should be done, what should be preferred, and so on,
from what

is

the case or can be done or must happen.

kinds of questions are
inquiry:

How does

indicative of the
one

as distinct
The following

broad scope of normative

know when one is using a specifically moral

8

9

argument or that a dilemma facing one is a moral dilemma?
identify someone else's claims as being moral?
sociologists or anthropologists
judgments of individuals who
situations as moral?

to

How does

one

What is it that enables

recognize certain

practices

and

live in different cultural contexts and

For better or worse, these are the sorts of ethi-

cal issues which are inherent in the normative umbrella.
One

such characterization of the

nature of moral judgment is

termed formalism and the argument which will
11

be developed

11

in this

chapter will be that formalism begs foundational questions, because the
very criteria which formalism poses
moral

as

11

forms

11

which

characterize a

judgment from other types of judgments (universalizability and

prescriptiveness) do not do the job.

These characteristics do not

distinguish moral judgments from aesthetic judgments, for example.
Some philosophers

do respond to the question "What distinguishes

moral judgments from other judgments?" or "What makes a judgment moral?"
by arguing (or assuming?) that there must be certain essential features
common to all instances of morality. A recent exponent of a purely formal account is R. M. Hare. 13 But in expounding and analyzing Hare's
ethical views, we need to be clear about what exactly
expounding and analyzing.
ments.

it is we are

The concern to date has been with moral judg-

Hare, though, gives moral rules logical precedence over moral

13 Hare's ethical theories are consistently developed in two books:
The Language of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), and
Freedom and Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

10
judgments.

We need to be cautious that we are expounding and analyzing

arguments relating to the same area of concern.
In saying that Hare's concern is with moral rules is not to change
the game.

Hare's claim that moral

rules

have

precedence over moral

judgments is not tantamount to saying that Hare's formal characteristics
are devoid of reference to moral judgment.

It

is,

after all,

moral

judgment which this study restricts itself to.
Hare's
tives).

point

is that moral judgments ENTAIL moral rules (impera-

We can only make the judgment that X ought not to be done if we

are committed to the rule that "All X's of a similar kind ought to be
forbidden. 1114 (The quotation marks are mine.) If one asks Hare where
such imperatives have their source, he would be forced to reply that the
source is derived from a standard or principle we assume, accept or commit ourselves to.
Hare,

then, could not reply that the source of our moral judgment

is self-evident.
tent.

To do so would mean that the source would

This is what Hare denies.

have con-

He says:

To become morally adult . . . is to learn to use 'ought' sentences
in the realization that they can only be verified by reference to a
standard or set of principles which we have by our own decision
accepted and made our own.15
14 R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, p. 10.
15 R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, pp. 77-78.

11

In The Language of Morals, Hare has not related
tics which entitle

the characteris-

a judgment to be called moral to the issue of

sources, that is, what forms the basis for or is the foundation
saying

11

X ought to be done. 11

for

In The Language of Mora 1s, Ha re goes so

far as to admit:
. • . if an enquirer still goes on asking 'But why should I live
like that?' then there is no further answer to give him . . . We can
only ask him to make up his mind which way he ought to live; for in
the end everything rests on such a decision of principle.16
There is something amiss, then, in The Language of Morals.

If Hare were

to insist that the source of a moral judgment is the same as that which
legitimizes

it,

he would be begging the question.

sharply distinguishes between a moral rule and the

To avoid this he

formal

characteris-

tics of moral judgments (universalizability and prescriptiveness).

The

latter constitutes a logical thesis for Hare, while the former constitutes a foundational thesis.

The two must not be confused.

Yet at some point he needs to integrate the logical thesis and the
foundational thesis.
arbitrariness.

Otherwise his foundational thesis

is

suspect of

Hare accomplishes this integration in Freedom and Reason

where he interrelates the twofold character of moral
scripscriptivity and universalizability).

judgments

(pre-

He writes:

When we are trying, in a concrete case, to decide what we ought to
do, what we are looking for . . . is an action to which we can
commit ourselves (prescriptivity) but which we are at the same time
prepared to accept as exemplifying a principle of action to be
prescribed for others in like circumstances (universalizability).
16 Ibid., p. 69.
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If, when we consider some proposed
versalized, it yields prescriptions
reject this action as a solution
cannot universalize the prescription,

action, we find that when uniwhich we cannot accept, we
to our moral problem -- if we
it cannot become an 'ought. '17

Hare's use of this twofold character of moral judgments, then, saves his
theory from foundational

arbitrariness

(which was a weakness of The

Language of Morals), while maintaining his logical thesis,

namely that

prescriptiveness and universalizability are logical characteristics of
moral judgments.

Put differently, "prescriptivity"

bility" serve a dual function:
One

and

foundational and logical.

can, of course, argue that formalistic theories are not foun-

dational, that is, by its very definition formalism does
foundation

"universaliza-

for morality.

In

discussing

Kant's

not supply a

brand of formalism

Bernard Williams argues that such an assessment of formalism
rect.

is

incor-

Williams writes:

Kant's outlook indeed requires that there can be no reason for
morality . . . but it does not imply that morality has no foundations.
Kant thought that we could come to understand why morality
should rightly present itself to the rational agent as a categorical
demand.18
It is this "prescriptiveness" which, then, is one grounding of the foundations of the formalistic perspective.
is "uni versa 1i zabil ity."

The other, it is being argued,

The case in point being argued is Ha re's pos i -

ti on.

MA.:

17 R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, pp. 89-90.
18 Bernard Williams, Ethics and Limits of Philosophy
Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 55.

(Cambridge,

13
To

reiterate, the function of moral judgments, according to Hare,

is to commend or guide choices -- prescriptivity, that is, the
tive

import

of moral

scriptive import.

descrip-

judgments, if any, is subordinate to their pre-

This needs to be argued for, though, and

not merely

asserted.
Hare

supplies two such arguments:

1)

He insists that words such

as "good" cannot be defined in non-value terms.
of a strawberry.

Hare gives the example

If we assert that "S is a good strawberry" we might be

led to conclude that this means nothing more than "S is a strawberry and
S is sweet, juicy, firm, red and large. 1119 Such an assertion, Hare
thinks, excludes us from
ordinarily
sweet.

say

saying

things

strawberries which we

for instance that a strawberry is good because it is

This is different from saying

strawberry because

about

it

not a descriptive term.

is sweet.

that

"Good,

11

a strawberry

is

a sweet

then , does not denote; it is

The function of "good" for Hare is:

Value terms have a special function in language, that of commending;
and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of other words which
do not perform this function: for if this is done, we are deprived
of a means of performing the function.20
Again,

Hare

is asserting what he needs to argue for, that is, he

is including his conclusion (that the function of "good" is to

commend)

in his conclusion while it ought, logically, to be part of the premise.

19 R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, pp. 85-86.
20 Ibid., p. 91.
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At another level, it is an empirical question if a lack of a definition
of 11 good 11 restricts one's ability to commend.
berry

To assert that a straw-

is sweet is to commend it; and to further say that the strawberry

is good is only to emphasize this point.
commending

because we

We simply are not hampered

in

have a definition of what makes an object good.

Hare is mistaken.
The second argument Hare considers concerns
11

good, 11

but his

11

ought 11

rather than

conclusion is the same, namely that it is intended to

apply to all moral terms.

Hare argues:

It is because I can act in this way or that, that I ask, 'Shall I
act in this way or that?'; and it is, typically, in my deliberations
about this 'Shall I?' question that I ask the further, but related
question, 'Ought I to do this or that?' Thus it is because they are
prescriptive that moral words possess the property which is summed
up . . . in the slogan -- 111 0ught 11 implies 11 can. 111 21
Again,
ance is

Hare's argument is problematic.

prescriptive

fulfilling

it.

not

follow

that one

is

The command is not any less intelligible or less

because

I can do thirty

situps.

pose of a command

is

to

find

pre-

Commands have different

purposes, and for Hare to reduce them to one is reductionist.

11

capable of

I can be commanded, for instance, to do fifty situps in

a situp contest.
scriptive

it does

Merely because an utter-

One

pur-

out the extent or limit of a task.

0ught, 11 at least in this sense, does not imply 11 can. 11

21 R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, p. 51.

Hare further

15
argues that the sense in which "ought" implies
logical entailment.

"can"

is

not

that

of

But to pursue Hare in this reflection is beyond the

focus of this Dissertation.
We are merely trying to clarify Hare's
have

a basis

for critiquing his formalism later.

that imperatives do not imply "can"
entailment,

approach

it

in

the

to morality

But since Hare says

strict

sense of logical

follows that imperatives do not imply "can" in the same

way as they imply "ought," or as "ought" implies "can."
Hare

is

to

This means that

entirely mistaken when he insists that "ought" statements are

prescriptive, for if "ought" does not imply "can" in the sense of logical

entailment, the only alternative is that "ought" implies "can" with

the mediation of a descriptive statement, that

is,

"ought"

statements

supply information.
Likewise,

to insist that value judgments entail imperatives, that

they do not provide information about the objects of choice,
guided.

The

imperatives.

best Hare

can

say

is mis-

is that SOME value judgments entail

He does not take into account

the

complexity of human

beings -- some people use factual statements to guide their choices.
at least there is a much more complex relationship between
and

imperatives than Hare considers.

information

It would seem more correct to say

that imperatives guide conduct, not choices.
tain

Or

The command to make

cer-

corrections in this Dissertation by members of my doctoral commit-

tee guides my conduct, not my choices.

16
W. D. Hudson brings out a number of arguments against Hare's concept of 11 prescriptivism. 1122 Hudson notes that some philosophers argue
against Hare's prescriptivism by arguing 11 that a man may judge morality
by one set of principles and conduct his life, or advise others to conduct theirs by another set. 1123 This means that one's moral judgment may
not be prescriptive in Hare's sense.

But Hudson thinks this critique of

Hare is misguided because Hare's prescriptivism is a logical theory and
not a theory of moral commitment.

Hudson writes:

It is one thing to be committed to the principle that one ought to
practice what one preaches, quite another to believe that one cannot
(logically) hold sincerely to a moral principle an2 not, given the
physical and psychological opportunity, act upon it. 4
The issue, then, is that Hare's prescriptivism is not affected by
critics, like Macintyre, 25 who argue that prescriptivism infers that an
individual can morally judge actions by one standard and guide
moral conduct by another.
It may
to the
thing
belief

her own

Hudson continues:

well be the case that Hare, as a liberal moralist, subscribes
former opinion; but what makes him a prescriptivist is somequite different, namely the fact that he holds the logical
just stated.26

22 w. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy,
York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).
23 Ibid., p. 205.

Second

Edition.

24 Ibid., p. 204.
25 see, Alasdair Macintyre, 11 What Morality Is Not. 11
Vol. XXXII (1957), p. 330.
26 w. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, p. 205.

(New

Philosophy,

17
G. Warnock has argued that moral judgments do much more than preThey also command, implore, and so on. 27 But again, according
scribe.
to Hudson, this is not a telling critique of prescriptivism.

Warnock 1 s

contention is true, but "simply to present a list such as Warnock's will
not in itself dispose of prescriptivism. 1128
The real criticism of Hare's prescriptivism is that it leads to an
absurd notion of morality.

Hudson writes:

. . . it seems to follow that it would make perfectly good sense to
say that anything whatever was good or that any conceivable course
of action ought to be taken. I could not (logically) offer anything
whatever as a reason for a moral judgment . . . 29
Finally, before we analyze Hare's brand of formalism

in more delet us note that Hare commits the "Socratic Heresy, 11 namely that

tail,

we never act in a way contrary to what we think to be right.

Hare

in-

sists on the following problematic conclusion:
Moral judgements always have a possible bearing on our conduct in
that we cannot in the fullest sense accept them without conforming
to them.30
Hare is saying:
1)

Although moral judgments are prescriptive, one's moral principles are derived from one's personal decisions.

27 G. Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy, (New
Martin's Press, 1967), p. 35.
28 w. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, p. 205.
29 Ibid., pp. 208-209.
30 R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, p. 67.

York:

St.
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2)

It

is illogical (contradictory) for one to adopt rule

11

R11 and,

at the same time, decide not to act according to it.
Hare's conclusion flies in the face of human experience.

If Hare were

correct that we never act in a manner contrary to that which we think to
be right, the assertion

11

I am going to work, although I'm burnt out and

know I ought to go on vacation 11 would not make sense.
One could, perhaps, argue that

11

ought 11 in the above type of example

is being used in a special, non-typical way -- a position that Hare
seems to be leaning toward. 31 But Hare is mistaken if he thinks that 11 I
ought to do X11 is incompatible (or contradictory) to saying,
intend on doing

X even

though I ought to do X. 11

sound odd, but it is not logically defective.

11

I do not

This utterance may

If Hare is to be consis-

tent in insisting that moral judgments guide conduct, he must admit that
a person can act contrary to her moral principles.

As Hare notes:

The ethical theory which has been briefly set out in the preceding
chapters is a type of prescriptivism in that it maintains that it is
one of the characteristics of moral terms . . . that judgments concerning them are, as typically used, intended to guide conduct.32
If we always

do what we think we ought to do, if we never do what we

ought not to do, anything would be permitted.

31 R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, p. 67.
32 R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, p.67.
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Hare, then, has the following view:
to

do X. 11

Suppose someone says,

11

I ought

According to Hare, if this is a moral argument it depends on

two conditions.
that entails
to be done.

The first is that

11

ought 11 is being

used

in a

sense

the desire or willingness to do whatever it is that ought
This is the prescriptive feature of moral judgment we dis-

cussed earlier.
won't do it,

11

At this point if the individual were to add,

she would be failing to use

for a moral judgment.

11

ought

11

in the sense

11

So?

I

required

We have already seen that there are philosophical

difficulties in holding this position.
The second condition is that the prescriptive principle (such as,
"Promises ought to be kept") is recognized as applying to everyone, that
is, the judgment will be the same for anyone else in
stances.

the

same circum-

If a person claims that she is not obliged to keep promises,

she must be willing to allow that all others may act in this way,

even

when they have made promises to her.
If the

individual

is

not willing to do this, she cannot excuse

herself on the grounds that there is a moral
that

it is morally permissible to break promises.

gy, moral judgments must be universalizable.
two

principle

conditions are satisfied,

the

In Hare's terminolo-

It is clear that if these

reasons advanced in deciding what

ought to be done must be considered as overriding by the
the decision.

to the effect

person making

In this theory there is no appeal to any content supposed

to be characteristic of moral standards, principles or judgments.
differently,

Put

any judgment that is both prescriptive and universalizable

is, by virtue of possessing these features alone, a moral one.

20

W. D. Hudson argues that Hare's concept of 11 universalizability 11 has
often been misunderstood. 21 Hare is not saying that because moral
judgments are universalizable a person ought "to be a busybody, always
poking one's nose in other people's ethical concerns. 1122 The universalizability characteristic of moral judgments likewise does not

in any

way encourage people to be "intolerant with those who disagree with one
on moral issues. 1123
Rather, Hare's point about universalizability

is

a logical

one.

Hudson writes:
His point is simply that, in saying 11 X is wrong because it is Y, 11 I
must, if I have really given the complete reason for what I say, be
saying that anything else which is Y is also to that extent wrong.24
Another criticism of Hare's universality characteristic of moral
judgments is that he neglects to notice the complexity of moral

notes, Hare takes pains to distinguish between
"universality and genera 1ity. 1125 Thus, 11 A moral judgment can be universalizable and at the same time very specific. 1126
ments.

But as

judg-

Hudson

Hudson also wants to argue that the manner in which Hare 1 s universalizability characteristic of moral judgments is made is vital to
21 w. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy,
York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).
22 Ibid., p. 210.
23 Ibid., p. 210.
24 Ibid., p. 210.
25 Ibid., p. 211.
26 Ibid., p. 211.

Second

Edition.

(New
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its

interpretation. 27

One

need not, for instance, continually try to

formulate the universalizability characteristic in such a way that
avoids being
and time.
cal.

it

logically applied only to actions done at a certain place

This would make the universalizability characteristic illogi-

Hudson asserts that such a possible state of affairs as the above

does not exist.

He writes:

The only reasons which would be recognized as moral reasons are such
as render the judgment grounded in them universalizable.28
Our concern here is not with the form of moral reasoning Hare advocates, but with the way he distinguishes the moral domain.

His

account

seems to be solely an attempt to describe what is common to moral experience in all its diverse forms.
have been able to
moral practices.
between moral

If this is

correct,

he must already

identify in some fashion various manifestations of

Had Hare been looking for a pattern of relationships
practices on

some basis other than on common essential

features, he might not have concluded that the distinguishing characteristics were entirely formal.
At any

rate,

to

the extent that these formal characteristics do

belong to moral judgment, they seem to be common to all
quiry.

normative

in-

The judgment that settles what a person should do may satisfy

the prescriptive and universalizable conditions, but still
kind many

be of the

people would call aesthetic or prudential, say, rather than

moral.
27 Ibid., p. 212.
28 Ibid., p. 212.
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People sometimes do recognize
moral

and as

act morally.
various

certain

reasons and judgments as

relevant to what they should do if they were disposed to
However, in making a decision, they give greater weight to

kinds

of non-moral reasons.

For example, they may agree that

moral reasons should be taken into account but refuse to treat them as
overriding.

If Hare's theory of purely formal criteria were correct, it

is difficult to see how this situation could arise in moral
For,

experience.

following Hare's logic, any prescriptive and universalizable judg-

ment on which a person acts is, by definition, a moral judgment.
In fact, it is doubtful whether the universalizable characteristic
is strictly necessary for a judgment to be moral.

When a person decides

that she should act in a way that is clearly beyond the level of common
duty,

she may be unwilling to claim that all other people in her posi-

tion should do the same thing.
certain

She may judge,

for

instance,

that

characteristics of her own life, which she cannot assume are

common to all people, are relevant to the moral decision in this
Of course,

case.

she may agree to the universalizable characteristic in the

very weak sense that anyone else exactly like herself should make the
same judgment in the situation.
In

illustrating the principle of universalizability, Hare asks us

to test some proposed way of acting by considering how we would feel
others were to act

in

this way toward us.

if

The test assumes that an

individual is prepared to treat her own feelings as being of the same
kind,

for moral purposes, as anyone else's.

It also assumes that one's

feelings about the way one is being treated are necessarily relevant to

23
moral

judgment.

A question to ask is:

ests, desires, needs and feelings of human
inquiry?

This

What weight should the interbeings be given

in moral

is an issue of content, and one on which moral systems,

all of which presumably exhibit the formal criteria, differ.
What will be argued here is that

Hare's brand of formalism is
incorrect analysis of the nature of meaning. 29 Hare

predicated on an
writes:

Value terms have a special function in language, that of commending:
and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of other words which
themselves do not perform this function; for if this is done, we are
deprived of a means of performing that function.30
And in another place:
Almost every word in our language is capable of being used on occasion as a value-word (that is, for commending or its opposite);
and usually it is only by cross-examining a speaker that we can tell
whether he is so using a word.31
It is here that Hare is clearly involved in a contradiction.
first

paragraph,

Hare gives

terms, that of commending.
Hare.

Yet in

the

a special

In fact, this

In

the

status and function to value
is

true by definition for

second paragraph the class of commending terms is

broadened to include almost any term.

A term commends or does

not

commend depending on the speaker's intention.
29 Alasdair Macintyre develops this thought in a different context
Chapter
in Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Philosophy,
Four.
30 R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 91.
31 R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, pp. 79-80.
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Hare cannot have it both ways.

The error of his ways lies in his

mistaken assumption that because there are some non-descriptive terms in
English whose meaning

is

the function they perform,

11

and 11 and 11 this 11

being two examples, then the term 11 good 11 is in the same class.
clearly false.

11

Good 11

does

This

not function the same way as 11 and. 11

is
Put

differently, if one says '"Good' is used to commend, 11 and another person
says

111

If'

is used to connect, 11 the two speakers are not implying that

the meaning of 11 good 11 and

11

if 11 is simply the function

which

they per-

form.
Hare

supplies a way out of this dilemma without knowing it.

As

was previously pointed out, Hare states that whether or not a term is
being used to commend depends on the speaker's intention.

The function

of 11 and 11 and 11 if , 11 on the other hand, is a convention of language,
is,

the function of these types of words does not depend on the speak-

er's intention.
tion

Likewise, commending (like questioning) is not a func-

of an individual term, like 11 and 11 or 11 if. 11

is in assuming that such assertions as
11

if 11

that

is

good 11 are used

to commend and

used to connect share a similar function, namely their meaning

is a function of their performance.
mending

11

Hare's mistake, then,

is a function

What we are showing

of expressions,

himself should have noticed this.

not

is

that com-

individual terms.

There is no other conclusion

Hare
to be

drawn if Hare accepts his contention that whether or not a term is being
used to commend depends on the speaker's intention.
correct,

Hare's

If the above

is

formalism suffers serious defects and cannot be a cor-

rect analysis of the nature and characteristics of moral judgments.
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A second
ment is the

representative of the formalist approach to moral judg-

psychologist Lawrence

Kohlberg.

We

feel

justified in

including an analysis of his formalist philosophical position because it
is precisely that, a philosophical theory.
his

philosophical

remarks

We will limit ourselves

and assumptions.

We also feel justified in

analyzing his position in this Dissertation because he relies
Kant and

Rawls,

all

formalists,

to

on

Hare,

albeit of different persuasions, in

developing his own theoretical formalistic constructs.
One prevalent notion of morality is that one's moral
related

to

a set of acquired

"good habits. 11

judgment

is

These good habits are

thought to be acquired by different sorts of training.

The

Freudian

notion of the internalization of various rules is an example.
is not merely an activity, though.

A habit
dency.

It is more of a ten-

William Frankena defines habit as:

. a disposition or dispositional property of a mind or person,
something that need not be activated at a given time and yet may
correctly be said to be present.32
Blindly following a specific code or value system whenever X type of
stimulus

is

present

is not what philosophers generally mean by habit.

Rather, a disposition or tendency is involved, not merely some type of
activity.
32w i. 11 iam
.

(Glenview, ILL.:

Frankena, Three Historical Philosophies of Education.
Scott, Foresman and Co., 1965), p. 2.
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The concept of habit, then, is a positive one, not one in which a
person is a blind follower of stimuli.

It is not enough for a person to

have acquired a habit, her reasons for acting must also be considered.
A person can obviously act justly for unjust reasons. The terms

11

habit, 11

"disposition," and "excellence" will be used synonymously.
In order for the individual to enjoy the "good life, 11 it is necessary that she develop certain dispositions or habits rather than others,
according to the logic of this view.

She needs

self-control,

stance, if she is to actualize her long-range goals.

for

in-

She cannot succumb

to every immediate inclination or desire.
Likewise, the person cannot enjoy the "good life" apart from society.

In fact, the "good life" is a shared social experience, as John
Dewey argued. 33 And the perpetuation of a viable society depends upon
the quality of the dispositions or habits of its members.

Dewey contin-

ues:
. . . habits of doing, thinking and feeling from the older to the
younger.
Without this communication ideals, hopes, expectations,
standards, opinions from those members of society who are passing
out of the group life to those who are coming into it, social life
could not survive.34
Various philosophers have articulated different conceptions
11

habit 11

and "dispositions."

In an attempt to be clear regarding this

brand of formalism, two such philosophers will be mentioned:
and John Dewey.
33 John

of

Aristotle

Aristotle believed that the individual ought to develop

Dewey, Democracy and Education.

Co • , 1916 ) , p • 2 •

34 Ibid., p. 3.

(New York:

The MacMillan
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those dispositions or habits which aid in living the

"good

life."

(A

position similar to Aristotle's will be examined in detail later in this
Dissertation when we consider virtue ethics).
Aristotle

The

"good

life"

for

is one in which the individual is able to engage in the maxi-

mum amount of "intrinsically excellent activities."

Earning a living,

for instance, is necessary to make the "good life" possible.
Aristotle

lists the types of dispositions or habits which aid the

individual in choosing the morally right action.

They include the

fol-

lowing:

1) courage, 2) temperance, 3) justice, 4) truthfulness, and 5)
friendliness. 35 His basic point is that the individual ought to choose
the

right action because it is right.

A person, then, habitually, yet

deliberately, ought to choose the right action for its own sake.
individuals

Since

have different capacities and social functions, each person

achieves "virtue" to the degree possible.

Not everyone

is

called to

perfection, according to this view:
All persons share in the different parts of the soul, but in
different ways. The slave is entirely without the faculty of
deliberation; the woman does possess it, but in an unauthoritarian
form; and if children also have it, it is only in an immature
form.36
Aristotle claims that virtue is related to practice.
ently, one becomes virtuous by doing virtuous acts.

Put differ-

He believes that we

35 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book IV, Chapter 1, 1123b, 1125a,
trans. by H. Rackham.
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1934).
36 Ibid.
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begin these habitual practices by performing acts which are objectively
We do not have an immediate or intuitive knowledge that the

virtuous.

acts we perform are virtuous, according to Aristotle. Thus, virtue is a
habit which is developed from a particular capacity through the further
exercise or habitual use of that capacity.
John Dewey likewise writes about the role of habit in making ethical

judgments.

Dewey defines the ethical person as one who deliberates
about an end to be achieved by a specific action. 37 Yet for Dewey this
deliberate activity presupposes types of habits.

He writes:

Our ideas, like our sensations, depend on experience. And the experience upon which they both depend is the operation of habits.38
Dewey further argued that a person's making of moral
cannot be
in point.

separated from her social experiences.

judgments

Customs are the case

As Dewey says in Human Nature and Conduct:

II

for

prac-

tical

purposes morals means customs, folkways, established collective
habits. 1139 Although Dewey does stress this notion of habit, he also
argues

that

habit can become mechanical, or merely lead to a perpetua-

tion of the status quo.

Thus, "impulse" is as necessary a characteris-

37 John Dewey, Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics.
(Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1891), p. 3.
38 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social
Psychology. (New York: Modern Library, 1922), p. 32.
39 Ibid., p. 75.
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tic of moral judgment as is habit.

Put differently, it is only through

the exercise of "intelligence" that both habit and impulse are mediated
for

Dewey.

If the environment constitutes a situation in which X habit

is detrimental to the common good, say, "intelligence" seeks to redirect
a change.

New types of customs and new institutions are thus created.

Dewey does

believe that

it

is

possible to work within already

existing social institutions and moral standards.
institutions

lead to

But when

society's

alienation or despair, it is time for "intelli-

gence" to begin to tentatively resolve the problematic

situation.

The

only end for the moral agent, then, is growth, according to Dewey
both individual and social growth.
the only moral end. 1140

Dewey writes that "growth itself is

Dewey does not believe that the ends are separable from the means.
Growth consists of the development of a person
integrated manner.

The end for

in an

harmonious

a person is not a fixed or absolute

state of perfection as it appears to have been for Aristotle.
growth,

of which moral

and

Moral

judgment, using the habit of intelligence, is

integral, includes the ability of the agent to intelligently understand
the various

alternatives

open to her -- and to make appropriate judg-

ments regarding the alternatives.
meet.
itself.

Thus, for Dewey, "fact"

and

"value"

Put differently, values are constituted in the act of evaluating
A value statement for Dewey is one which fulfills certain con-

40 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy.
Books, 1948), p. 177.

(New York:

Mentor
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textual conditions.

If one's activity leads to the ability to make more

viable moral judgments, if it leads to further growth, then that activity is valuable. 41
A value,
reality.

then,

is not a distinct entity apart from the world of

Rather, the particular situation determines if an activity (or

a moral judgment) is valuable or not.

Dewey writes:

Appraisals of courses of action as better and worse, more or less
serviceable, are as empirically justified as are non-valuative
propositions about impersonal subject matter.42
The

intent now, then, is to note Kohlberg's criticism of the

tue as good habits" theory.
in moral

theory and

11

vir-

Kohlberg's claim is that habit has no place

habit has

no

relationship

Kohlberg seems to reduce habit to a behavioristic

to moral judgment.
interpretation.

He

writes:
The contrast between these experimental studies and the child
rearing studies suggests that direct training and physical types of
punishment may be effective in producing short-run situational conformity but do not directly produce general internalized habits of
moral character carried into later life, carried outside the home,
or carried into permissive situations.43

41 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty.
Sons, 1960), p. 260.
42 Ibid. , p. 22.

(New York:

G. P.

Putnam's

43 Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Moral Character and Moral
Ideology, 11 Review of Child Develo ment Research, Eds. Martin Hoffman and
L. Hoffman.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), p. 389.
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Kohlberg,
ward.

then,

is reducing habit to training, punishment and re-

This concept of habit is not philosophically defensible.

previously argued,

good habits are

punishment and reward orientation.
is

produced through a

Rather, as Dewey suggests,

a habit

a disposition by which the individual uses her intelligence to medi-

ate a problematic moral situation.
notion

of habit

In a word,

Dewey's

philosophical

is much more complicated than Kohlberg's:

not merely a response to X stimulus.
the

not merely

As was

a habit is

If this is Kohlberg's criticism of

behaviorist's notion of habit, he is certainly correct, but it is a

philosophical mistake to reduce all concepts of habit to this model.
Furthermore, Kohlberg is involved in a contradiction.
the

He denies

importance of habit in moral judgments, yet some notion of habit is

indispensable in his cognitive-developmental theory of moral
making.

decision-

As William Alston writes:

. even if one were able to get along in moral psychology without
any reference to habits of behavior, and this may be Kohlberg 1 s
aspiration, his own examples illustrate the difficulty of getting
along without using habit concepts at any level.44
What Alston is arguing is that each stage of moral growth
delineated

Kohlberg

has

incorporates some cognition of a problem with specific types

of behavioral concepts -- reward and punishment at a particular stage of
moral development, for example.

Thus, Alston is arguing that each stage

44 william P. Alston, "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From Is To Ought,"'
Genetic Epistemology, Ed. Theodore Mischel. (New York: Academic Press,
1970), p. 281.
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of moral

development

has incorporated in it some notion of habit -- a

habit which defines the stage and whose transcending is necessary in the
move to a higher stage.
Kohlberg
habit.

is

in opposition to the "stimulus-response" paradigm of

His claim that an overemphasis on habitual

behavior)

can

judgment

lead to rigidity and conformity is obvious.

follow, though, that habit has virtually no place
Even

moral

in moral

(or

It doesn't
judgment.

if it were argued that Aristotle's definition and enumeration of

habits were inadequate, it would not mean that habit has no relevance to
moral judgment making.
The

same critique of Hare's criterion of universalizability can be

applied to Kohlberg.
present
plies to

We do not want to rehash old ground

Kohlberg's analysis
forming moral

regarding moral

here but to

of moral motivation, especially as it ap-

judgments.

It

is

in

Kohlberg's arguments

motivation that he differs from Hare -- who, it seems,

regards prescriptivity as the foundation of moral motivation.

One acts

because one ought to, because it is one's duty to do X, because one's
moral judgment regarding X has prescriptive value.
Let us examine the notion of moral motivation more
an

article written with

studies which attempted to

Daniel

Candee,

correlate the

carefully.

In

Kohlberg analyzes empirical
relationship between moral

judgment and moral action. 45 The classical study of this issue was by
45 Lawrence Kohlberg and Daniel Candee, "The Relationship of Moral
Judgment to Moral Action," Essa son Moral Develo ment, Vol. II, The
Psychology of Moral Development, Ed. Lawrence Kohlberg.
New York:
Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 498-581.

~--='..,_-:-~~~~-:-:-..,.....,....!--~~--,..,..,-~~-:--
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Hartshorne and May in which they attempted to correlate the relationship
between

the

degree of convinction an

individual had toward a moral
value, such as honesty, and the person's moral actions. 46
Going back to Aristotle, Hartshorne and May seemed to be assuming
that virtue is learned and that it is guided by reason.

Their method-

ology was to:
look inductively at behaviors loosely corresponding to
common-sense conceptions of honesty, correlating these behaviors
with one a?other and with tests of moral knowledge and moral
attitude.
Hartshorne and May, then, attempted to demonstrate that the adolescent
world could be divided into individuals who cheated and those who did
not on

the experimental

tests given them.

strate that the adolescents who cheated
likely

to cheat

in another.

They also tried to demon-

in one situation were more

Their data was predicated on the belief

that moral behavior can be predicted from verbal reports on

the values

the adolescent adhered to.
Hartshorne and May were not able to validate their hypotheses.

In

fact, they even found that cheating in one situation did not necessarily
predict cheating in other situations. 48 Kohlberg and Candee proceed to
46 Kohlberg and Candee 1 s analysis of Hartshorne and May is found on
pp. 498-502.
47 Ibid., p. 499.
"': .. '
48 Ibid., pp. 499-500.
'

'

:-.
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argue that Hartshorne and May overlooked a moral ~motion component and a
moral judgment component. 49 Their arguments here need to be assessed.
Kohlberg and Candee suggest that perhaps Hartshorne and May's failure to validate their hypotheses 11 was due to a test method in which
subjects were not emotionally invested in following or violating a standard.1150 They reject this argument, though:
Thus, we also feel that emotional arousal does not seem to be an
internal determinant necessary to define moral behavior.51
It seems like Kohlberg and Candee are attacking a 11 straw man. 11 Who
ever suggested that emotional arousal defined moral behavior? Even the
theories Kohlberg and Candee reject, such as 11 resistence to temptation
studies, 11 11 fantasy punishment reacti ons 11 or 11 tota 1 guilt measures, 1152 do
not conclude that emotional arousal

11

defines moral behavior. 11

There is

certainly a difference between saying that emotional arousal is an essential
behavior.

component

in moral behavior and arguing that it defines moral

Kohlberg and Candee 1 s confusion is obvious when

that emotional
define moral

arousal
behavior,

is

not an

using

they argue

internal determinant NECESSARY to

the

term 11 necessary 11 the way most
philosophers use the term 11 sufficient. 11 It is hard to imagine that any
person would ever argue that emotional arousal played such a strong part
49 Ibid., p. 500.
5olbid., p. 501.
51 Ibid., p. 502.
52 Ibid., p. 575.
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in moral action.

Such a claim is certainly counter intuitive.

No sense

could be made of moral freedom if the above were true.
Kohlberg and Candee then investigate theorists who argue that there
is an integral connection between moral knowledge and moral behavior,
position

Kohlberg himself adopts in a different form than the theorists

he and Candee mention.
Herrnstein,

In the main, these theorists, such as Brown and

Milgram, Zimbardo, and Latane, "suggest that undergraduates

and adults act immorally despite their moral judgment action
under suitable
sures.1153

a

institutional

and

situational

capacities

incentives and pres-

Kohlberg and Candee argue that such studies are mistaken

to their two-track theory of moral learning and growth.

due

They write:

In our view moral judgment development both causes action and arises
out of the action itself. A new moral judgment may guide new behavior while the performance of a new behavior may lead one to construct a new moral judgment. In either case, however, there is a
unitary developmental process involved in the development of both
moral judgment and action.54
Kohlberg and Candee also notice another reason why both
theorists,

those who argued

types

of

for a moral emotion component to moral

judgment making and those who argued for cognitive factors, failed:
The reason for this failure, we believe, lies in the fact that when
confronted with a real moral situation individuals do not reason in
terms of abstract values but rather define the situation in terms of
concrete rights and duties.55
53 Ibid., p. 505-506.
54 Ibid., p. 575.
55 Ibid., p. 578.
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Thus

to

insist to an individual that cheating is always wrong, an ab-

stract moral prohibition, is translated by the individual into specific
situational
trouble."

terms,

such as

11

If you

cheat and get caught you are in

Kohlberg and Candee argue that this conclusion is born out by

their empirical

research

in which

moral judgment stage and action

11

the observed relationship between

indicates

that there

is often a

relationship between the way in which subjects define rights and duties
in hypothetic verbal situations and the ways in which they
in actual ones. 1156

define them

Kohlberg and Candee supply two reasons why the research arrives at
this conclusion.
sonal

The first they call the 11 personal consistency or perresponsibility approach. 1157 In this approach moral actions are

defined as those which are consistent with what the individual judges to
be right.
The other approach is termed 11 universal right. 1158 And this
approach is predicated on the view that an

action

is

judged moral

because it is consistent with an objective or universal moral principle.
A critique of the conclusions
Kohlberg

and

of the

in

social

psychology

Candee assess, as well as their own research findings, is

beyond the competency of this writer.
can

research

But a few

philosophical

be made regarding Kohlberg's concept of moral motivation.

some of Kohlberg's other work, then, that we now turn.
56 Ibid., p. 579.
57 Ibid., p. 579.
58 Ibid. , p. 579.
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Kohlberg, on the other hand, does argue that motivation
tant in moral

judgment making.

is

impor-

Merely because he labels his theory

cognitive-developmental, it does not follow that he is not interested in
moral

motivation.

Nor does it follow that the cognitive domain and the

affective are totally separate or qualitatively different.

In

fact,

Kohlberg believes that both cognitive and affective aspects are present
in moral judgment making. 59
Individuals at different stages of moral

development make moral

judgments based on different motivational criteria, for Kohlberg. At
Stage 1, individuals are motivated by the desire to avoid punishment.
The primary motive for making moral judgments at Stage 2 is a desire for
reward or benefit.

At Stage 3 the motivating concept is anticipation of

the disapproval of others.

In other words, the individual feels guilty

because of the reaction of someone else -- or the anticipated or perceived

reaction of someone else.

by a sense of community respect.

At Stage 4 individuals are motivated
Judgment leading to an action which

might receive the condemnation of the community is one which the Stage 4
individual feels she ought to avoid.
Kohlberg

develops

judgment interviews.

his arguments

It must be

in mind that

based on data received during moral

What he is actually analyzing

making, not moral action taking.

kept

is moral

judgment

If Kohlberg has something meaningful

59 see, Lawrence Koh 1berg, "From Is To Ought: How To Commit the
Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development,"
Essa son Moral Develo ment: Vol. 1, The Philoso h of Moral
Development, Ed. Lawrence Kohlberg.
New York:
Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1981), pp. 183-189.
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meaningful

to say about moral judgment, either by way of empirical evi-

dence or philosophical argumentation, the moral

philosopher needs

to

listen.
At

Stage 5, then, an important motivational distinction is made

between community condemnation and
individual's moral

self-condemnation.

The Stage

judgments are not merely based on the needs of the

community; she also wants to avoid judging herself as wrong,
or inconsistent.
.
60
perspec t ive.

She

The point is that she has

becomes

It is not until Stage 6 that self-

the modus operandi of moral judgments. At Stage 6

individuals achieve self-respect by acting
principles. 61
There

It is at this

arguments become difficult to grasp.
questions (questions about
for

upon

self-accepted moral

is also a relationship between motivation and moral judgment

making, intuition and knowledge.

making,

broadened

looks at both self-condemnation and community

condemnation as reciprocal issues.
condemnation

irrational

She still is concerned with the proper development of

the good of the community, though.
her

5

Kohlberg 1 s

Although he seems to ask the right

knowledge appropriate

instance, which

to moral

judgment

analytical philosophers like Hare do not

raise), Kohlberg s answers seem fuzzy.
1

point that

For example,

he

notes

that

knowledge is a kind of philosophical intuition, and the individual who
60

Lawrence Kohlberg, 11 Indoctrination Versus Relativity in Value
Education, 11 in The Philosophy of Moral Development, pp. 6-28.
61 Ib1'd.' pp. 19 - 22 .
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possesses this knowledge makes appropriate moral judgments which lead
her to act. 62 In fact, he suggests that once the individual has
intuited that

11

X11 is right, she will be motivated to perform 11 X. 11

This

contention will be discussed in some detail later.
Kohlberg, then, does assume that motivation is an important element
in moral judgment making.
stages of moral

Yet, in

his

theoretical

development, for example (concepts of rights, duties,

justice, etc.), he only includes one motivational
thirty possible at each stage.

concept out of the

What motivates the individual to con-

sistently make more appropriate and
certainly

framework of the

reliable moral

judgments?

It

isn't contradictory to argue that Kohlberg's cognitive and

motivational criteria are merely necessary conditions

for

progress

in

moral judgment making, not sufficient conditions.
Even though we have noted that Kohlberg sees a relationship between
cognitive and affective factors in the development of moral
making,

he does stress cognitive factors

judgment-

often to the neglect of the

very motivational factors he assumes must be present.

He writes:

. . • the cognitive-developmental view holds that cognition and
affect are different aspects of, or perspectives on, the same mental
events, that all mental events have both cognitive and affective
62 see, for instance, Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral and Religious
Education and the Public Schools: A Developmental View, 11 in The Philosophy of Moral Development, pp. 294-305.
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affective aspects, and that the development of mental dispositions
reflects structural changes recognizable in both cognitive and
affective perspectives.63
Yet he makes the untenable claim that 11
the presence of
strong emotion in no way reduces the cognitive component of moral judgment.1164 He does not specify in any detail how this affective domain
operates.

He does not offer arguments, either empirical or theoretical,

to convince one that the affective domain is integral to development
moral

judgment making

in

although, as was said, some relationship is

demanded by the sequence of stages of moral development he presents .
. . . moral judgment dispositions influence action through being
stable cognitive dispositions, not through the affective changes
with which they are associated. Textbook psychology preaches the
cliche that moral decisions are products of algebraic resolution of
conflicting quantitative affective forces . . . Affective forces are
involved in moral decisions, but affect is neither moral nor immoral.
When the affective arousal is channeled into moral
directions, it is moral; when it is not so channeled, it is not.
The moral channeling mechanisms themselves are cognitive.65
In effect, Kohlberg is denying what he purports to argue for, namely that affect has

place in moral judgment making.

If

"channeling" is all that is called for, affect is to be controlled;

it

does

an

integral

not afford an essentially creative ingredient in moral judgment

making.

In fact, it is not clear what place motivation has, in

63 Lawrence Koh 1berg, Stages of Mora 1 Deve 1opment
Moral Education," Moral Education: Interdisci linar
C. M. Beck, B. Crittenden and E. V. Sullivan.
Toronto:
Toronto Press, 1971), p. 44.
64 Ibid., p. 44.
11

65 Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is To Ought," p. 139.

a Basis for
roaches, Eds.
University of
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Kohlberg's

scheme,

although he wants to argue that moral motivation is

essential, albeit reducible to a cognitive mechanism.
ate because

if Kohlberg

had been clearer,

This is unfortun-

he could have offered

arguments supporting a formalist position which might
convincing

have been more

than Hare's notion of prescriptivity or commending.

Perhaps

Kohlberg's formalism will fare better in his discussion of the relationship between knowledge and virtue.
Some

philosophers

have

held that the virtuous person is also the

knowledgeable person, that is, they see a direct connection between
virtue and wisdom.
slogan.
this

"Knowledge implies virtue"

is

the oft-repeated

Plato is perhaps the most well known philosopher who espoused

view.

Plato believed that

knowledge is found neither in sense

perception nor true judgment.

Rather, he believed that

be

is real.

infallible and of what

knowledge must

He argued that sense perception

cannot be the whole of knowledge because some types of knowledge involve
and terms which are not perceived through the senses.
.
.
.
. t 66
mat1cs
is
a case in
po1n
.
arguments

Plato, then, believed that knowledge is possible, and that
volves that which is both infallible and permanent.
that knowledge involves that which is universal.

Mathe-

it in-

What Plato meant is
Frederick Copleston,

commenting on Plato, writes:
66 Plato discusses this, among other places, in The Republic in the
metaphor of the Divided Line.
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. . . true knowledge is knowledge of the universal.
Particular
constitutions change, but the concept of goodness remains the same,
and it is in reference to this stable concept that we judge of
particular constitutions in respect of goodness. It follows, then,
that it is the universal that fulfills the requirements for being
an object of knowledge. Knowledge of the highest universal will be
the highest kind of knowledge, while 'knowledge' of the particular
will be the lowest kind of knowledge.67
Although

Kohlberg

has areas of disagreement with Plato (he con-

ceives of justice as equality, not as Plato's hierarchy, for
it

is evident that

he

is a Platonist.

instance),

In a neglected article (one

necessary for fully understanding Kohlberg's philosophical commitments)
Koh 1berg writes, 11 . . . not only is the good one, but virtue is knowl edge of the good. 1168 With Hare we found that his position involved him
in this Platonic paradox, and we offered arguments why this position is
defective.
knowledge

Similar arguments, then, apply to Kohlberg's contention that
is

integral

to moral judgment which issues in moral action,

that is, once moral knowledge is known there
between moral

knowledge,

correct moral

is a direct correlation
judgment making and virtuous

action.
When Kohlberg discusses moral knowledge it is evident that
not

referring

he

is

to empirical facts (again like Hare) -- nor opinion nor

social convention.

He is referring to a type of philosophical knowledge

or intuition -- unlike Hare.

Put differently, knowledge, for Kohlberg,

67 Frederick Copleston, S. J., A Histor of Philoso h , Vol. 1:
Greece and Rome. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1962 ,
p. 175.
68 Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of
the Platonic View, 11 Moral Education: Five Lectures, Ed. T. · Sizer.
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 58.
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is

an

ideal

form,

like justice, and it is not arbitrary or relative.

Knowledge includes, of course,
according

to

this view.

become inseparable.

personal

conviction and commitment,

Knowledge, moral judgment and action, then,

As Thomas Lickona writes:

A given stage of cognitive development is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the parallel moral stage . . . 69
Although

this view is difficult to sort out, as contemporary phil-

osophers do not seem to use this sort of language, an example might make
the

position clearer.

years, say.

A woman has been using marijuana for a number of

She believes that using marijuana is harmful

ally and mentally.

physic-

She understands that its use is against the law.

Yet, she smokes it anyway.
pect that

both

At some time in her life she begins to sus-

there is more to life than the pattern of sensuality she has

been espousing, so she turns to religion.

She stops using marijuana.

She has acquired a type of knowledge, let us argue, and from this knowledge she has received conviction and commitment.
Although the example
knowledge
Moral

Kohlberg

claims

that

is virtue he seems to have this sort of situation in mind.

knowledge leads to conviction; conviction leads to proper moral

judgment making;
action.

is contrived, when

proper moral

judgment making leads to proper moral

Although the term 11 leads 11 is being used here, for Kohlberg the

69 Thomas Lickona, ed., Moral Development and Behavior -- Theory,
(New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
Research and Social Issues.
1976)' p. 21.
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elements of the process of philosophical (moral) intuition are
able.

This

argument may not make

Kohlberg's

insepar-

claim any truer, but

hopefully it makes it more understandable.
One essential problem with Kohlberg's tying of moral
acceptable moral

judgment making

demonstrate

the

experience, for instance.

to

is that he seems to be inconsistent

about the value of experience in the moral life.
ingly

knowledge

He does

relationship between moral

not convincknowledge and

Isn't experience a kind of knowledge, albeit

not philosophical (or moral) intuition? What is a "live option" for one
individual, leading to moral judgment, may be superficial or unimportant
to another.

One's attitude toward moral judgment making is certainly

conditioned by one's experience.

Being in a concentration

camp during

the Second World War and experiencing the slaughter of Jews clearly has
import upon one's subsequent moral

judgments.

Critiquing

Kohlberg's

position, Blasi writes:
If one should trust the present analysis . . . not only do psychology and social science have nothing to say about what I consider
to be one central aspect in moral functioning (the development of a
moral personality), but their neglect, or avoidance, is a result of
much broader and much stronger cultural currents.70
Kohlberg,

obviously, cannot be saying that experience has no place

in explaining the foundations of moral judgments.

What he is content to

70 Augusto Blasi, "The Moral Personality:
Reflections for Social
Science and Education," Moral Education: Theor and A lication, Eds.
Marvin Berkowitz and Fritz Oser.
Hillsdale, New Jersey:
Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1985), p. 418.
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claim seems to be that knowledge is virtue discovered by a special type
of human experience, philosophical or moral intuition.
knowledge

Thus, this moral

is not a product of experience in the usual sense of "experi-

ence. 1171
Yet Kohlberg seems to be involved in a dilemma.

He has just argued

that experience is the raw material upon which the cognitive and affective processes work.

And he has noted that one factor in the growth of

moral

judgment making is the ability of the individual to take alternative moral roles. 72 At different stages of moral development, for
instance,

the

individual s response to authority, rights, obligation,
1

duty, and so on are
relationship

partially determined by

to society.

how she perceives

her

The relationship between "raw human experi-

ence" and "pure philosophical intuition," as a basis for moral

judgment

making, is not at all clear.
Although

Kohlberg

does

claim that moral knowledge is a type of

philosophical intuition, he does not mean to deemphasize the value of
human experience

in moral

judgment making.

Indeed, he cannot -- for

human experience is the font of moral judgment making, for him.

Yet the

notion that moral knowledge is a type of philosophical intuition lends
itself to a belief in universalizability being one of the formal characteristics in answering the issue of the nature of moral judgment making.
71 For a philosophical critique of the relationship between experience and moral principles, see Otfried Hoffe, "Autonomy and Universalization as Moral Principles: A Dispute with Kohlberg, Utilitarianism and
Discourse Ethics," Moral Education: Theory and Application, pp. 89-108.
72 see, Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is To Ought, 1111 pp. 141-142.·

46

But "lending to a belief" differs from "convincingly arguing for,"

and

Kohlberg, like Hare, has not done the latter.
Likewise,

Kohlberg does not describe or define intuition.

faculty or a process?

Is it a

He suggests that intuition is a kind of insight

which

is drawn out of the individual -- a position consistent with his
Platonism. 73 Yet this is hardly a definition. Before Kohlberg's brand

of formalism is philosophically acceptable, then, he needs further argumentation.

At the very least it has

been

shown that

the areas of

formalism he shares with Hare are susceptible to the same criticisms we
have made of Hare's position.
is willing

Kohlberg is braver than Hare in that

he

to ask questions about moral knowledge and motivation and

their relationship to moral judgment making.

We will

issues somewhat in our discussion of virtue ethics.

73 Refer to Kohlberg's "Education for Justice."

revisit these

CHAPTER III
THE CONTENT APPROACH
One such approach to including content into a determination of the
characteristics of a moral judgment is that of Kurt Baier in
Point of View.

The

The Moral

philosophical inadequacy of justifying morality in

terms of human wants, then, will be argued.
Although Baier desires to contrast his position to a moral

point

of view based on the legitimacy of acting on self-interest, he winds up
defending what he has spent time arguing against, that is, Baier accepts
l

that moral

rules,

of a fully enlightened sort anyway, are justifiable
because they are in a person's self-interest. 74
Baier offers a rather Hobbesian argument that without morality
human life would degenerate into a kind of savagery in which human wants
could not be satisfied.
1ish what he wants

At the very least, his argument does not estabit to, namely it does not show that a person can

realize her wants (or interests, for that matter)
accepts

and

adopt~

fully

only

if she

morality as Baier describes the moral point of view.

It is vacuous to say that living in human society, because it presup74 This
(Ithaca, NY:

is a main theme of Baier's
Cornell University Press, 1958).
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The Moral Point of View.

48
poses a type of morality -- a contention Baier assumes and does not argue for -- is preferable to living as a beast.
that

it

is

At most Baier can argue

in a person's self-interest to accept a particular social

moral code, which may, incidentally, differ from a moral
through a laborious
abide by social rules.

code accepted
process of conscientious decision-making, 75 and
As was suggested, here Baier is confusing

per-

sonal morality with social sanctions and rules.
Put another way, the most Baier has shown is that it is to a person's advantage to use morality, a particular social moral
has

not

not

He

supplied arguments why one should be moral, why it is to one's

advantage to be moral.
is

system.

There are obviously occasions, though, when

it

to one's advantage to follow a particular social morality.

To

1

suggest that it is in the interest of the black
South Africa

individual

living

in

to follow the country's system of apartheid is silly.

It

would be facetious to maintain that acting morally in such a social situation promoted the black person's self-interest.
Put more

strongly,

if acting morally were to be justified ulti-

mately as a matter of self-interest, even

though

self-interest adds

content to the notion of moral judgments, it has no justification in the
kind of case that was just mentioned.

Even if Baier were to argue that

75 Lawrence Kohlberg develops this line of reasoning in "Moral
Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental View, 11 Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research and Social Issues. (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976), pp. 31-53.
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the previous example of South Africa is an extreme, borderline case, it
still does not follow that a

rational

and thoroughly

self-interested

person will always act on the principle that what she is doing is to be
in her best interest.
acting

If a person recognizes that she will benefit from

in accord with a repressive system of morality, this will be one

factor in the moral decision-making process.
decisive factor.

But it

need not be the

An individual can conclude, quite rationally, that she

can promote her self-interest by acting

inmorally,

acting against a

particular system of morality, that is.
The above argument

can

be put another way.

One can come to a

point as to have no reason to believe that her judicious

violation of

moral rules will undermine the whole institution of morality whereby she
l

loses the general advantage it gives her.
individual

At any

rate,

even

if an

always did what was morally required because she had been

convinced that acting morally was the best policy for getting what she
wanted, we can think of many situations where such activity would not be
praiseworthy.

Self-interest, then, is

hardly a characteristic which

separates the moral from the non-moral.
Let us, though, take a deeper look at Baier's position.
to Baier, moral judgments provide information.

Baier notes

According
that phil-

osophers who are prone to argue that moral judgments are nonfactual do
so because they have a rather limited notion of what verification
valves.

Baier says:

in-
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Philosophers rely on a highly specialized model of empirical verification. They think of it as verification by looking, listening,
touching, or sniffing. It should have occurred to philosophers that
often a good deal more is involved than that.
Thus, I may claim
that the Union Theatre has 500 seats. But I cannot verify this by
looking, listening, touching, tasting or sniffing.
It should,
therefore, be declared not to be empirically verifiable. No one has
ever objected to counting as a nonempirical way of verifying propositions.
Nor, strangely enough, to measuring or weighing. Yet
these latter methods involve arbitrary standards and often criteria.
But when value judgments are made, people claim that they are not
verifiable because they involve criteria and standards.76
Many value judgments can be verified quite easily.

If one

says,

"This is a good car," the assertion can be verified by going for a ride.
Even in this seemingly trivial case, though, one may argue that the
is

not

"good"

because

it

does

not have electric windows.

words, the argument often seems to hinge on the

criteria

for

car

In other
applying

the term "good," even to a car -- a nonethical' sense of "good."
It

is

easy

to

notice that there is a difference between saying

"This is a good car" and "This is good for me to do."
agreement

about

the

than the good act.
different

characteristics

car" is "good" due to
starts without

by which to measure the good car

Even though an enlightened

criteria are used
factual

There may be more

philosopher

notes

that

in legitimizing one assertion ("The good
characteristics

it

runs

smoothly,

difficulty, etc.) than another (the characteristics for

saying "X is a good act" are not as straightforward), the issue does not
end here.

The distinction between types of assertions and types of

76 Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View, p. 61.
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characteristics

for legitimizing the "goodness" or "properness" of them

is a real distinction, but if left without further comment, the distinction is not very helpful.
One way of elucidating the difference between the above two assertions is to suggest that "This is a good car 11 is a factual claim, while
11

X is good" is, at least, more than a factual claim: it is evaluative in

Hare's sense of making a statement regarding the

appropriateness

of a

behavior in relationship to the behavior's properties.
Getting back to Baier's analysis, a value judgment cannot be confirmed by a process of verification,
Value judgments,
11

validation,

11

unlike many

that is, the characteristic of goodness need to be

judgment is a moral judgment.

necessary

in confirming

But Baier is involved in an

infinite regress, at least as regards his "validation" hypothesis.
judgment that

11

shown

Baier is saying, then, that both

verification and validation are two processes
"X 11

judgments.

according to Baier, must also go through a process of

to be the right or correct criteria.

that

factual

The

X, Y and Z" are the proper criteria to make M a moral
11

11

judgment are themselves derived at through a value judgment which

needs

to be validated -- as with any criteria of validation one can dream up.
Baier is aware of the problem when he notes:
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• . . the proper criteria for evaluating cars, fountain pens, plyers
and so on are determined by the purpose of the thing, activity or
enterprise in question.77
For Baier, then, the question "What should I do?" is equivalent to
"What is

the best thing to do? 11

This must be the case, he argues,

because it would be contradictory to say
do"

and

sti 11

ask "What should I do?"

11

! know X is the best thing

The best action, then, is that

action which is supported by the best reasons, what Baier refers
"consideration-making beliefs."

to

to as

He writes:

The fact that I have a reason for or against entering on the proposed line of action does not entail that I ought or ought not to
enter on it -- it merely presumptively implies it. That is to say,
it might be taken to imply that I ought or ought not to enter on it
unless, later on, in the weighing of considerations, I find some
that are weightier than this one. In that case, the original presumptive implication has been rebutted.78
l

For Baier, the "consideration-making belief" has a certain universality -- for instance, if one performs X and finds
good

reasons for doing X.

one

has

These good reasons would be equally true for

everyone in this particular situation.
relativism by this move.

it good,

Baier tries

to avoid ethical

A "consideration-making belief," then, is not

synonymous with one's consideration.

This is not a matter of the agent

liking a particular consideration, nor a "consideration-making belief"
being so because one likes it.

77 Ibid., p. 80.
78 Ibid., p. 102.
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Although Baier elaborates three different kinds of "considerationmaking beliefs, 11

individual

rules,

arguments need not detain us here.

social rules and moral rules, his

To

develop

the

logic of Baier•s

position, it is preferable to describe what he means by "the moral point
of view, 11 then to analyze and critique his
point that

position.

is at this

it becomes obvious that Baier rejects a pure formalist ap-

proach and argues that judgments are moral due
content.

It

to a consideration of

Indeed the above discussion of "consideration-making beliefs"

brings this out.

Now, though,

11

consideration-making beliefs" need to be

discussed within the context of "the moral point of view. 11
For Baier, it is "the moral point of view" which determines whether a moral judgment is true or false; and it is a "consideration-making
belief"

which designates

aesthetic judgment.

a judgment as moral, as opposed to, say, an

"The moral point of view, 11 then,

is

that of 11 an

independent, unbiased, impartial, objective, dispassionate, disinterested observer
therefore,

. a God's-eye point of view. 1179 A judgment is moral,
if it

is based upon "the moral point of view, 11 that is if

"the moral point of view" overrides all other considerations.
At this point, though, Baier has
analyzing "the· moral point of view. 11
79

Ibid., p. 201.

not been very descriptive
He does claim that it has two

in
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essential

features:

moral principles.

1)

To adopt "the moral point of view" is to adopt

Such principles as respect for

merely individual rules.

life,

say,

are

not

Rather, a moral principle, for Baier, does not

admit of exceptions and it is considered to be universally binding.

2)

The second feature of 11 the moral point of view 11 is that the principles
it sanctions are for the good of everyone.
situation,

then,

When it comes

Baier enumerates three conditions which, if enacted,

demonstrate that a particular action is immoral:
11

X"

to a social

if the consequences of

would be harmful if everyone did it; each member of the society is

entitled to engage in it; and to engage in

11

X11 is an

indulgence,

never

an altruistic act.
What is confusing at this point is that the above three conditions
are only valid, Baier seems to say, if society "Y" considers act
be immora 1.

11

X"

to

Clearly, if this analysis of Baier's position is correct,

one could always ask,

11

Why adopt the 11 moral point of view"

when

it

is

against my self-interest to do so?" The only defense Baier seems to have
for adopting a moral point of view which,

often,

is

in violation of

one's self-interest is that if such a moral point of view is not adopted
self-interest becomes the guiding ethical influence.

And

Baier, with

his universalistic ethical tendencies, decries such a state of affairs.
The very raison d'etre of a morality is to yield reasons which
overrule the reasons of self-interest in those cases when everyone's
following self interest would be harmful to everyone. Hence moral
reasons are superior to all others.BO

BOibid., p. 309.
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Although it is reasonable to
because

there are

reasons

say an action ought to be done

for doing it, if the reasons for doing

outweigh the reasons against doing 11 X, 11 Baier still
certain

facts

are

reasons

clarifying this situation,
beliefs"

and other facts
Baier's analysis

X11

hasn't argued why

are

not.

Rather than

of "consideration-making

only adds another category for clarification.

This means that

Baier must use another category, "the moral point of view, 11
for the

11

to account

fact that moral judgments can be either true or false.

He is,

perhaps, like a painter who has painted herself into a corner:

every

possible way out becomes constricted by adding paint.

Maybe due to the

fact that Baier cannot (or has not) supply reasons why certain facts are
reasons and other facts are not reasons, he cannot be convincing why one
ought to adopt "the moral point of view" at all.
this

"moral

Let us, then,

examine

point of view" characteristic in more detail -- for "the

moral point of view" seems to be a characteristic of content.
It is difficult to understand if "the moral point of view"

refers

to any point of view in particular, that is, if it is a view that IS
actually held or one that OUGHT to be actually held.

There is an impor-

tant difference here which has important ramifications for the idea that
"the moral point of view" is a content-characteristic
moral

in defining a

judgment or in distinguishing a moral judgment from other norma-

tive judgments.
How can "the moral point of view" be a point of view actually held
by anyone?

It is actually the case that different people adopt a dif-

ferent moral point of view regarding abortion,

say,

so that

if "the
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moral

point of view" has any standing it must be a point of view that

OUGHT to be held, not one which actually IS held.

Let us

see if this

alternative makes sense.
To endorse such a theory as "the moral point of view" is the view
that OUGHT to be adopted because it OUGHT to be adopted
circular.

is

(clearly)

Or even worse, for Baier to argue that "the moral point of

view" has the standing of moral because it is the

point of view that

OUGHT to be adopted is contradictory to his theory.

He has just argued

that morality is not to be based on self-interest.
But if "the moral point of view" is that point of view that

OUGHT

to be adopted, upon what basis other than self-interest OUGHT it to be
adopted?

Baier has not supplied any other basis,

except to say that

self-interest OUGHT not to be the guiding basis for ethical decision
making.
If the above is correct, it seems impossible to formulate a moral
theory such that the defining characteristic of a moral judgment is that
it is adopted within the confines of "the moral
seems clear,

then,

point of view."

It

that Baier's criterion is found wanting; and this

particular attempt at a content approach
moral judgments is incorrect.

to defining and justifying
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Another

attempt to develop extra-formalistic aspects

(i.e.,

content-aspects) to answering the issue of the characteristics of moral
judgments

is that of Stephen Toulmin.

Toulmin notes that to say 11 X is

an ethical action" or 11 X is ethically appropriate" has little bearing on
the nature of the action itself.
intimate that actions

11

X,

11

11

Such assertions, he argues, do not

Y, or Z possess a particular property.
11

11

11

Rather, such assertions intimate that there are "good reasons" for doing
11

X, 11

11

Y, 11 or

11

Z. 11

He writes:

Rightness is not a property; and when I asked the two people which
course was the right one I was not asking them about a property -what I wanted to know was whether there was any reason for choosing
one course of action rather than another; and, provided that they
are arguing about the reasons for my doing different things, we are
perfectly justified in talking of a genuine contradiction between N
is right and No not N, but M. The idea (which the philosopher takes
for granted) that, if one man attributes the predicate X to anything
and another withholds it, they cannot be contradicting one another
unless X stands at least for a property is a fallacy. All that two
people need (and all that they have) to contradict one another about
in the case of ethical predicates are the reasons for doing this
rather than that or the other.81
We need to, then, further elucidate what Toulmin means by "good
reasons,

and to relate this to the nature of moral judgments. Hear.
. su1. gener1s,
. 82 th at is, it is neither
. 1 reasoning
gues th a t e th ica
is
11

inductive nor deductive.

As he says:

One point which the imperative doctrine fairly emphasizes is the
difference between arguments from logical, mathematical or factual
premises to conclusions of a similar logical type, and arguments
81 stephen Toulmin, The Place of Reason in Ethics.
Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. 28.
82 Ibid., p. 55.

(Cambridge:
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from factual premises to conclusions of a different kind, conclusions about duties or values . . . Although factual reasons (R) may
be good reasons for an ethical conclusion (E), to assert the conclusion is not just to assert the reasons, or indeed anything of the
same logical type as R. It is to declare that one ought to approve
of, or pursue, or do something-or-other.83
For Toulmin a "good reason" to label a judgment (or an action)
ethical goes well beyond logic.
sophical
conduct?"

issues,

such as

Toulmin wants to consider broad philo-

"What

is

the

Like many philosophers before him,

purpose of ethics in human
Toulmin

sees ethics as

tied in an integral way to the harmonious development of community life.
Duty itself, he notes, is a communal concept in that we alter our claims
because they conflict with the justified claims of others -- or because
adhering to our claims might negatively affect communal life. 84
Some moral judgments, such as

"One should

keep

promises,"

are

moral precisely because promise keeping is tied to the harmonious living
out of community 1ife.
promise?"

Thus if one is asked

"Why did you

keep your

and she were to answer, "Because I ought to," such an answer

would be ethical justification for keeping promises -- that is, it is a
socially recognized principle that promises ought to be kept.

Indeed if

they were not, community life would be intolerable.
For the sake of argument, let us agree with Toulmin.

There is

no

great philosophical difficulty with his position so far -- and who would
suggest that promises ought not to be kept?

Or who would argue that

promise keeping is integral to harmonious community living? All of this
83 Ibid., p. 55.
84 Ibid., pp. 133-136.
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may be a truism and not exactly philosophically important (although
socially necessary).

Yet Toulmin realizes that promise keeping

clear case of social
conflicts of duty?

priority.

is

a

What about cases in which there are

About these Toulmin remarks:

. . . one has to weigh up, as well as one can, the risks involved in
ignoring either, and choose 'the lesser of two evils.' Appeal to a
single current principle, through the primary test of the rightness
of an action, cannot therefore be relied on as a universal test;
where this fails, we are driven back upon our estimate of the probable consequences.85
Although

the above quote makes imminently good sense (and we will

attempt to develop an ethical model which integrates the various aspects
of a moral judgment later), we must note what Toulmin is not saying.
is not suggesting that one always ought to follow conventional
munity morality.

To say this would contradict the above quote.

to ask "Is X moral"? is really synonymous to asking
particular moral code I subscribe to?"
ask "Is X conventionally adhered to?"

"Is

He

or comRather,

X within

the

To ask, "Is X moral?" is not to
The answer to "Is

X moral?"

is

not so much society's answer, but it is the answer of an individual who
adopts a particular moral scheme, albeit this particular society's moral
scheme.
Yet,

if the above is a correct

interpretation of Toulmin's

thoughts, there is a feeling of uneasiness here.
continues:

85 Ibid., p. 147.

For instance,

Toulmin
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Within the framework of a particular scientific theory, one can ask
of most things, 'Is this really straight?', but the criterion of
straightness cannot be questioned; within the framework of a particular moral code, one can ask of most individual actions, 'Is this
really right?,' but the standards of rightness cannot be questioned.86
Surely this is false.
questioned.

Even within science itself basic

standards are

Isn't this questioning the basis of scientific revolutions?

The application of morality itself changes -- or our moral judgments are
broadened -- precisely by questioning our moral standards.

Recent phil-

osophical work, say by Peter Singer, on animal rights is an example of
the questioning of moral standards, of the interpretation of moral standards.

To give but one more example, slavery was an accepted practice,

even within the framework of early Christianity.
to obey their masters.

But by questioning

St. Paul tells slaves

the moral

standards which

applied to treatment of people, and by expanding the concept of person
to include slaves, perhaps, Western culture began to think differently
about the morality of slavery.
Morality is different than mathematics in that morality clearly is
not a totally deductive system (mathematics may not be either, for that
matter, although Euclidian geometry is as close as we can get, perhaps).
Even though Toulmin claims the contrary, he is viewing morality as a set
of axioms, called moral standards, that are true because of their relationships within a system, called morality.

And this

is

deduction.

Rather, morality, as we will argue later, is much more wholistic than
86 Ibid., pp. 148-149.
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this

and much more ambiguous and complicated.

As we argue in other

places in this Dissertation, without commitment morality does
sense.

not make

It is this sense of commitment which Toulmin begins to get at in

his remarks about moral conflict, but even here his 11 weighing up 11 smacks
too much of a mathematics of morality.
It
sorts:

is obvious that Toulmin thinks that moral judgments are of two
1) Those whose answers are unequivocal, for they are demanded by

the accepted moral

code

one extra-formalistic or content-aspect to

moral judgment making; and 2) those moral judgments which can only be
analyzed

in

light of an assessment of probable consequences, a second

content-aspect to moral judgments.

Category 1 has such few candidates,

promise keeping being the paradigm case, that it is difficult to see how
Toulmin is saying anything philosophically important.
where the ethical action is.

Category 2 is

In summarizing his view Toulmin writes:

An action which is an unambiguous instance of a maxim generally
accepted in the community concerned . . . will be right just because
it is an instance of such a maxim: but if it is an action over
which there is a conflict of duties, or is itself a principle (or
social practice) as opposed to a particular action, it will be right
or wrong according as its consequences are likely to be good or
bad.87
It
1)

seems

that Toulmin

is

A moral principle and a social

involved

in a number of confusions.

practice are

fact, they may have no bearing on each other.

not synonymous.

If one makes the distinc-

tion between practices and institutions Macintyre does,

for

instance,

practices, such as playing a game of football, are involved in using
87

lbi d.' 134.

In
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principles

by which to assess behavior (face mask violations are wrong

because of the injury they can afford the player).
football,

the NFL,

for

The

institution of

instance, may or may not have positive moral

bearing on the game -- although we tend to believe it does act
interest of the players.

in the

It may, say during a merger, act solely in its

own self-interest, as a social practice does.

At any rate, to collapse

the distinction between moral principles and social practices certainly
is bad philosophy.
2)

approach

Toulmin's concept of "good reasons,"
to moral

an extra-formalistic

judgment making, itself is ambiguous.

clear if "good reasons" are justifications for saying "X
for

saying

"X

ought to be done."

He is never

is

right"

or

Put differently, are "good reasons"

reasons for doing "X" or merely reasons for asserting that "X" ought to
be done? Toulmin has not clarified which.
The above criticisms may make one suspicious about the relevance
of "good reasons" as the characteristic for making sense of the
of moral

judgments.

But the

issue

nature

is more complicated than this.

Toulmin further confuses things by asserting:
We must give up the traditional oblique approach of asking, first,
What is goodness? and What is rightness? and attack our central
problem from scratch . . . We shall have to go right back to the
beginning, to the first form in which we asked our question: What
kinds of argument, of reasoning, is it proper for us to accept in
support of moral decisions?88
This

complicates

the

issue because Toulmin is begging the very

question he is attempting to answer.
88 Ib1·d., pp. 63 - 64 .

As was mentioned before,
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argumentation within mathematics (in many instances) is deductive.
method of moral reasoning is not.

The

Philosophers do not even agree about

what constitutes a valid moral judgment (if they did this

Dissertation

would not be necessary) -- much less on appropriate moral argumentation.
Since this is the case, Toulmin can never develop criteria of moral
reasoning ("good reasons") before there is some consensus regarding what
constitutes a valid or invalid argument in morality.

At the very least,

he is putting the cart before the horse.
A final difficulty with Toulmin's content-approach to moral judgment making is that he argues that the validity of moral judgment making
only makes sense within the framework of community life.

As he argues:

The only context in which the concept of duty is straightforwardly
intelligible is one of communal life -- it is, indeed, completely
bound up with this very feature of communal life, that we learn to
renounce our claims and alter our aims where they conflict with
those of our fellows . . . . And we can fairly characterize ethics as
a part of the process whereby the desires and actions of the members
of a community are harmonized.89
Toulmin is involved in a logical error in the sense that before he
can validly argue that 11 X is moral" makes sense,
leads

to

community

harmonization

if and only

if,

(a content-aspect of moral judgment

making), he must argue that this very principle, namely 11 X is moral,
and only

it

if

if, it leads to community harmonization," itself is part of a

community's moral code.

But it can't be.

89 rbid., p. 133 and 136.

If it were, Toulmin would,
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again, be begging the question.

He would be saying in effect that one

ought to obey the community's moral code because there is a principle in
the community's moral code which says that one ought to obey the community's moral code.
Toulmin supposes that his argument that the function of moral discourse is to lead to harmonization of interests is a logical thesis.
Warnock insists that this is not the case.

G.

He says:

. it was either an empirical generalization about the aims which
people in fact often pursue when they use moral language, or it was
itself a moral recommendation.90
Part of the reason for this confusion is that Toulmin views science and ethics as proceeding along the same lines, that is,
translate

they both

reports of what seems to be the case to what is the case.

As

Toulmin writes:
In both, one encounters a contrast between the 'appearance' and the
'reality'
the scientist distinguishing between the 'apparent'
colour of the sun and its 'real' colour . . . the moralist distinguishing those things which are 'really' good, and those actions
which are 'really' right, from those things which we simply like and
those actions we simply feel like doing.91
One

problem with

and ethics start with

this view is that it assumes that both science
"incorrigible direct

reports"

and eventually

replaces these with "fully fledged judgments" which are "far from incorrigible.1192 As Warnock argues, the assertion "This looks obligatory,"
90 warnock,

Contem~ora ry__

Moral

Philoso~hy__,

p. 127.

91T ou 1min,
.
The Place of Reason in Ethics, pp. 84-85.
92 warnock, Contem~ora ry__ Moral Phi 1oso~hY.., p. 133.
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using the model of 11 This looks red, 11 does
assertions

and

not make

sense. 93

Ethical

scientific ones simply do not share the characteristics

Toulmin imagines.
But an even more telling criticism of Toulmin's theory is that it
eventuates in an 11 absurdity. 1194 It is one thing to claim that moral
reasoning has practical import; it is another to argue that 11

it

influences

people to one and only one purpose -- namely, to the purpose
of harmonizing their interests. 1195
In actual practice people use moral terms in ways other than with
the

intent to

harmonize interests.

In fact, at times moral terms are

used to create conflict which may or may not lead to any sort of harmony of interests.

As Warnock argues:

The principle of social harmony points only to one set of possible
moral standards or criteria for applying terms like 'good,' 'right,'
or 'ought'. To say that the purpose of moral discourse is to serve
social harmony is thus itself a proposal or recommendation to adopt
one set of moral standards among alternative ones.96
It seems,

then,

that content explanations for determining the

nature of moral judgments fail because they often beg the very question
they are attempting to answer, that is, when an extra-formalistic criterion is brought into the mora 1 picture (be it 11 good reasons, 11
consequences, or whatever) the extra-formalistic criterion itself needs
93

Ibid.' p. 134.

94

Ibi d. ' p. 136.

95 Ibid., p. 136.
96 Ibid., p. 136.
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justification.

And,

if Toulmin

and Baier are representative of the

content approach to moral judgment making, the very content they suggest
is

part of their conclusion when it needs to be part of the premise of

their argument.

CHAPTER IV
THE VIRTUE ETHICS APPROACH
A third theory elaborating the characteristics of a moral judgment
is the virtue ethics approach.

The work of Alasdair Macintyre is

worthy in the recent development of this approach.

note-

Although this theory

is more complex than the other two we previously investigated, we want
to argue

that

it holds

the most promise for answering the question:

What characteristics make a judgment moral?

But, as will be argued, the

virtues approach by itself has severe philosophical flaws.

Thus, a more

eclectic approach to answering the question of this Dissertation will be
offered.
The virtue ethics

approach goes back to the work of Aristotle.

Such an ethic attempts to define the ends of human life and to enumerate
the characteristics which constitute a "good person. 1197 The argument is
that once the nature of human virtues is discovered, then the living of
the good life is the living out of the virtues -- the end of human life
and the good life for humans, then, become synonymous.
97 This point is developed in Samuel Enoch Stumpf s PhilosoJhy:
History and Problems.
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1983 , pp.
1

78-104.
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Virtue, therefore, is the disposition
right conduct.

to act on

principles

Virtue becomes that which a good person does.

of

One such

delineation is offered by Macintyre.
although

he

refers

He offers a definition of virtue,
to his definition as "partial and tentative. 1198 He

writes:
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of
which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal
to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from
achieving any such goods.99
Inherent

in Macintyre's definition of virtue is the distinction

between goods external to and internal to practices.
is

in

need of clarification.

This

distinction

To illustrate the distinction Macintyre

offers the example of the child, the candy and chess:
Consider the example of a highly intelligent seven-year-old child
whom I want to teach to play chess, although the child has no particular desire to learn the game. The child does however have a
very strong desire for candy and little chance of obtaining it. I
therefore tell the child that if the child will play chess with me
once a week I will give the child 50 cents worth of candy • . .
Thus motivated the child plays and plays to win .
• so we may
hope, there will come a time when the child will find in those goods
specific to chess, in the achievement of a certain highly particular
kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive
intensity, a new set of reasons, reasons now not just for winning on
a particular occasion, but for trying to excel in whatever way the
game of chess demands.100
98 Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue.
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 178.
99 Ibid., p. 178.
lOOibid., p. 178.

(Notre

Dame,

Indiana:

69

Such goods

as

analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive

intensity are, for Macintyre,

goods

internal

to the

practice.

He

defines a practice in rather broad terms:
A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules
as well as the achievement of goods.101
Macintyre, then, wants to maintain a particular logical process of
prioritization in understanding and articulating virtue.

The process is

initiated by determining what is valuable, that is, the values
to

practice.

internal

Once this is accomplished, one can determine which quali-

ties are virtues and which are vices.

This is still rather vague,

but

Macintyre attempts to clear things up by suggesting that it is the particular satisfactions of engaging in practices that set off those qualities that are virtues from those that are vices. 102
What makes

Macintyre s position a bit muddled is that he also
1

wants to maintain values external to the practice are also part and par.
. . 103 per haps th e more
ce 1 of va 1u1ng,
sue h as wea 1t h an d recogn1t1on.
primitive a society was, the closer tie there would be between values
internal to practice and values external to practice

the reason being

that in such a society life would consist almost entirely of practices,
practices
extent.

the members

all agreed upon and all participated in to some

Perhaps, though, as Edmund Pincoffs suggests,

lOlibid., p. 176.
l0 2Ibid., p. 177.
l0 3 Ibid., p. 180.

11

the issue .

70

whether internal or external values are most worth cultivating is irrelevant here. 11104
Perhaps

the issue here is misplaced.

Instead of asking about the

import and status of values internal or external to practice,
issue

the

is with competition among values, not complementary values.

real
As

Clinton Collins suggests:
It seems to me that the different sources of value in human lives
lead not, as Macintyre assumes, to complementary values but rather
to competing values . . . He does not, however, consider the possibility that the objectivity of virtues is in no way a guarantee
against their being in conflict with one another.105
One may wonder if in the quest to conceive life as

a unity,

part of

Macintyre's Aristotelian project, he is short sided regarding the nature
of human life, that is, the competition of values in one's life

-- the

need for value prioritization.
It

is clear that Macintyre

basis of ethics.

is attempting to find an objective

Indeed he laments the fact, as he understands it, that

contemporary thought has so tied virtue to subjectivity that any possibility of objective value is lost.

This is inherent in his critique of

emotivism. It is this proposed (or sought after) objective basis of
104 Edward Pincoffs, 11 Definition of the Virtues, Virtues and Med1c1ne: Ex lorations in the Character of Medicine,
Ed.
Earl
Shelp.
Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985 , p. 125.
105 Clinton Collins, "Before Virtue: A Critique of the New Essentialism in Ethics and Education, 11 Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual
Meetin of the Philoso h of Education Societ , Ed. Emily Robertson.
Normal, Illinois: Illinois State University, 1985), p. 210.
11
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ethics which gives unity to a person's participation in the common practices of the culture. 106
The

basis Macintyre is looking for he discovers in the narrative
unity of a human life which is transmitted in the telling of stories. 107
It is the narrative unity of one's life, then, which is the criterion of
the worthiness of one's practices.

Note,

however,

that

in

none of

Macintyre's arguments does he argue for the objectivity of virtue.
does he argue that when certainty regarding value
objectivity be discovered.

Almost

certainty is equivalent to objectivity.
unity of narrative with

is

found,

Nor

so will

like a Cartesian he assumes that
Macintyre,

then,

assumes

the

practice -- or in the language we have been

using throughout this Dissertation, the unity of form and content.
For Macintyre, the unity of a person's life is embodied in "the
unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. 11108 It follows that the
good life for an individual consists in the
that unity.

systematic

As much appeal as Macintyre's theory might have (Who would

not like to think of their life as embodying unity?
as

living out of

To view one's

life

fragmented certainly is less than desirable), Kai Nielsen notes some

difficulties with Macintyre's position.

In the first place,

one could

be kind, decent and understanding, one's life could be unified by such a

106Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue, p. 203.
l0 7 Ibid., p. 114.
l0 8 Ibid., p. 203.
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narrative and "still be a lost human being utterly astray in Eliot's
Wasteland. 11109 Secondly, there are numerous individuals whom most of us
would describe as having lived a life unified by value, but by a value
we find despicable, such as Hitler.

Nielsen continues:

One's life can be through and through evil and still have such a
unity and it could, in certain respects, be a good life and lack
that unity.110
Likewise, one still wonders what criteria Macintyre would give for
success or failure in living out one's narrative.
one's life is being proportioned appropriately.
that

One is never sure if

I feel,

for

instance,

since my wife recently had a baby I need to travel less and be at

home more.

Does this mean that I'm presently

out the unity which is my narrative?

not

successfully living

If I attempt to travel less I will

not earn the proper amount of money to support my baby in a way my wife
and

I feel

is

necessary.

How do I know when my life is in balance?

Macintyre does say that "the only criteria for success or failure

in a

human

life as a whole are the criteria of success or failure in a narrated or to-be-narrated quest. 11111 But this begs the question of the

109 Kai Nielsen, "Critique of Pure Virtue:
Virtue-Based Ethic," Virtue and Medicine, p. 139.
llO Ibid., 139.
111 Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue, p. 203.
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very criteria which would do the job.
certain.

That there must be criteria is

That Macintyre has not supplied any is also certain.

Likewise, Macintyre certainly has

offered a definition of the

good.

But he still hasn't given instances of it:

it is.

He does write:

he hasn't said what

. those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and
enable us to achieve goods internal to practices, but which will
also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by
enabling us to overcome the human dangers and distractions we
encounter . . . 112
All this is well and good -- and the above might even be a true

charac-

terization of the good -- but it is hardly a hint at what a person's
final end is.

Macintyre continues:

We have arrived at a provisional conclusion about the good life for
man:
the good life for man is the life spent in seeking the good
life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those
which will enable us to understand what more and what less the good
life for man is.113
Is Macintyre saying that the good is beyond grasp, that the quest is all
there

is?

Without some knowledge of what the destination is, how does

one know which train to catch?
ethical

goods.

Macintyre, then, has not delivered the

Surely he has correctly diagnosed the serious destruc-

tion of the objectivity of ethics.

Surely he has offered wisdom regard-

ing the processes in life which indicate our need to unify our lives.
112 Ibid., p. 204.
113 Ibid., p. 204.
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lives.

And surely he has helped us understand the relationship between

moral tradition and social/political
begin

to address

practices.

the question of this

But before one can

Dissertation:

What are the

characteristics of a moral judgment (What makes a judgment moral?),
needs

to

know more

than

Macintyre offers.

If a judgment is moral

because it is in conformity with the good, one needs to
good is

one

know what the

and that good needs to have universalizability.

If Macintyre

is correct, as he may not be, when he notes that much of one's moral
life consists of choosing between types of evil, it seems to be impossible to engage in the task of choice if there is no good by which to
measure which degree or aspect of evil to comply with.

It is for all

the above reasons that, no matter how insightful Macintyre s theory may
1

be,

Macintyre 1 s brand of virtue ethics is not helpful in answering our

question.
it.

His analysis gets us to the verge of an answer without giving

To merely supply a process of attainment leaves much to be desired.
The following is a clear example of Macintyre s logic:
1

reasons why knowing one's telos in life is essential without

supplying
indicating

what that good is:
I have suggested so far that unless there is a telos which transcends the limited goods of practices by constituting the good of a
whole human life, the good of a human life conceived as a unity, it
will both be the case that a certain subversive arbitrariness will
invade the moral life and that we shall be unable to specify the
context of certain virtues adequately.114
114 Ibid., p. 189.
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The sense and seriousness of this sentence can easily be appreciated.
But Macintyre begs the question of the nature of that telos by remarking
(again with high seriousness and sense):
. . . there is at least one virtue recognized by the tradition which
cannot be specified at all except with reference to the wholeness of
a human life -- the virtue of integrity or constancy.115
Is the virtue of integrity or constancy synonymous with one's telos?
times

Macintyre seems to be suggesting this.

At

And if this is the case,

the question of this Dissertation makes little sense

in a Macintyrian

moral universe -- for the end cannot be specified except in reference to
something else, integrity or constancy. But to add,
singleness of purpose

in a whole life can have no application unless

that of a whole life does,
clarity.

"This notion of

11

adds

poetry and mysticism,

but hardly

Again, we may be looking in the wrong place for the clarity

needed to answer,

11

What makes

singleness of purpose

a judgment moral?"

in a whole life may be some kind of answer, but

one that needs more fleshing out than Macintyre affords.

115 Ibid., p. 189.

If it exhibits
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A final

view of virtue ethics we will examine in some detail is
that of James Wallace. 116 Wallace views the virtues as integral to
appropriate

human moral behavior, that is, the living out of the moral

virtues (which, as Philippa Foot notes, contra Aristotle, need to be
separated from the aesthetic virtues, say) 117 is the single most factor
which contributes to human good.

As Wallace writes:

Particular virtues perform certain functions, play certain roles, in
human life.
A great number of factors in many different ways contribute systematically to human good, and virtues in specifiable
ways so contribute . . . 118
According

to Wallace,

then, ethics is a practical subject, what

today is called 11 applied ethics. 11

It is ethics,

on this

view, which

orders human conduct -- within the family, one's business, or the larger
community, for instance.
tues

is

the sine

-9.!:@.

Since the development and living out of vir-

non of the moral life, for Wallace, humans are to

be characterized as possessing certain (proper) capacities
cies.

and

tenden-

Thus:

We can conceive of the creature's good as the unimpaired exercise of
these capacities. Thus, an individual's living well or badly will
be a matter of its relative success in carrying on these activities.
To understand what success in these activities is, one must understand the activities.119
116 James Wallace,
(Ithaca, NY:
Cornel 1
Virtues and Vices.
University Press, 1978).
117 Philippa Foot, "Virtues and Vices, 11 Virtues and Vices and Other
Essa)s in Moral Philosophy. (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1978 Chapter One.
118 James Wallace, Virtues and Vices, p. 15.
119 Ibid., p. 26.
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This view seems to be at odds with the notion
versal

that certain uni-

traits or tendencies issue in specific virtuous acts.

there is an evident theoretical

difficulty

here,

Although

Wallace contradicts

himself when he admits:
Our notion of a human being living well is bound up with a multiplicity of complicated moral and social values. There is an obvious
conventional aspect to these matters, and therefore conceptions of
the good life have varied so from time to time and from community to
community. Human health may be studied as one studies the health of
other living creatures, but the idea of a human being's living well,
in the full sense, is so bound up with conventional values, that its
study must be very different from the study of other living
things.120
Now it may be true that 11 certain conventions will be better than
others for a given community in a certain situation. 11121 But if virtue
is as closely tied to conventional values and behavior as Wallace argues, his brand of virtue theory

is

philosophically problematic.

To

follow convention may (or may not) lead to the building of community
but at the sacrifice of certain members of that community who disagree
with its "virtue conventions."

Or, one could follow the "virtue conven-

tions" of an oppressive community only to find

the

community secure,

while citizens are in constant danger if they disagree with "conventional virtue."

Put differently, "convention" is an ambiguous concept;

and

fallowing convention is not synonymous with developing personal virt ue. 122 If this is what Wallace means by "living the good life," his
120 Ibid., p. 33.
121 Ibid., p. 36.
122 The work of Lawrence Kohlberg, which we
viewed, is a position contradictory to Wallace's.

have previously re-
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concept of such a virtuous life is indeed limiting and questionable.
Using
virtue.

Wallace's

"virtue ethics," then, leads to a fixed idea of

This is implied when he writes that "only if individuals

have

certain fairly fixed traits of character can they live successfully
· vir
· t ue given
·
thi"s th eory.
. 11123 There i·s no room f or grow th in
It
is

as if Wallace does not seem to realize that the virtuous life is one

in which ethical conflicts are the pattern of the day.

And in ethically

conflicting situations virtues are not enough, for both virtues and ethical principles need to be prioritized if the virtuous
led.

life

is

to be

The point is that moral judgments cannot even be made if virtue is

fixed within the individual.
routine

Morality

itself becomes mechanized and

-- certainly not "the life worth living" with its tragedies,

complexities and conflicts.
Rather than viewing ethical judgments within the context of virtue
ethics, this writer would take another road.

It can be argued that par-

ticular events take on additional significance from their contexts.
note played

by itself has a particular sound.

A

The same note with the

same sound heard as part of a melody has an additional significance.

It

is heard not in isolation but in relation to the notes which come before
and those which come after.
In a similar way many human actions gain an additional
cance from their context.

signifi-

The act of shaking hands has one significance

123James Wallace, Virtues and Vices, p. 160.
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when old friends

meet, another significance when strangers are intro-

duced, and still another significance when two people who have quarreled
are reconciled.

To point out another's mistake has one sort of signifi-

cance when it is done to tease a friend, a different significance when a
devoted teacher helps a student, and a third kind of significance when
it is done out of spite.
good,

Clearly, one cannot judge whether an act

is

nor the extent to which it is good, if one does not grasp the

contexts which give additional meaning to the act

a fact

to which

Wallace seems oblivious.
One

important context arises from the fact that doing things of a

particular kind makes one a particular kind of person -- extending virtue ethics

in this sense.

If one frequently tells lies, for instance,

one constitutes herself as a dishonest person. Once

she

realizes

that

this is so there is a new dimension added to her choice about whether or
not to tell the truth.

One becomes responsible not only for the partic-

ular good or bad things one causes outside of herself by her choice.
She becomes responsible for the kind of person she is and will become.
At this point she can put more of herself into a moral

judgment.

One chooses one or another alternative not only because of its quality
in itself but also because one chooses to become a particular kind of
person.

In

this way, one may choose to be loyal to a friend not only

because of what it does for one's friend, but also because one wills
be the

kind of person who is loyal to friends.

willing which is absent from virtue ethics.

to

It is this concept of
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In commenting on virtue ethics, Philippa Foot views the virtues as
"correctives to vices. 11124 This view also has built into it a rigid
notion of virtue, as well as a questionable philosophy of human
that

is,

nature,

humans are viewed with suspicion, as opposed to being viewed

with trust.

Foot is certainly not a romantic.

Yet in

her "Are Moral

Considerations Overriding?" she argues that they are not.

She says:

It seems then that the thesis that evidential moral considerations
are invariably taken (by anyone who cares about morality) as more
important than other considerations is simply false. The thesis
that verdictive moral considerations are invariably taken as more
important than other considerations is also false.125
Without developing

her reasons for this conclusion (and without

examining the difference between evidential and verdictive moral
siderations),

con-

the reason Foot is correct is that moral judgments appear

in contexts of the sort we have previously suggested.

It is

no credit

to virtue ethics, then, to not have noticed this, nor to have minimized
the place of human will in making moral judgments.
Let us examine virtue ethics from another perspective
Bernard Williams.

For Williams,

that of

it is not the virtue habits one has

which are the primary factors in understanding the nature of moral judgments,

it is an examination of one's projects, or what we referred to

124 Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices, Chapter One.
125 Philippa Foot, "Are Moral Considerations Overriding?" Virtues
and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, p. 187.
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as contexts earlier. 126 Williams uses various synonyms for project in
his work, such as "desire," "concern" and "commitment. 11127 And, projects can be of a variety of sorts -- from a concern with basic
to religious

commitment,

say.

projects as "ground projects,"

survival

Williams refers to the latter sorts of
and

under this

category he includes

artistic interests and strongly held moral convictions.
It

is

the

projects in one's life, for Williams, which "help to
constitute a character. 11128 That is, it is one's projects which morally
(and in other ways) set her apart from others -- demonstrate her uniqueness and individuality, an exactly different philosophical emphasis than
Wallace's,

say, with his emphasis on convention and uniformity.

is precisely these "ground projects" which define

And it

someone as a human

person, for they persist over time.
One value which Williams holds strongly to is 11 integrity. 11129 For
him it is integrity which indicates human wholeness and a commitment to
living out one's moral commitments.

Any moral philosophy, then, which

126 J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism,"
Utilitarianism: For and Against.
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University Press, 1973), pp. 110-112 and Bernard Williams, "Persons,
Character and Morality," The Identities of Persons, Ed. Amelle Rorty.
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 201.
127 Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality, p. 201.
128 see especially, Berna rd Willi ams, "Mora 1 Luck, 11 Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. L, 1976, pp. 115-135.
129 Ibid., pp. 118-125.
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views impartiality as a primary moral value in moral judgment making
suspect, given Williams' position.
In

Let us examine why this is so.

certain consequentialist ethical theories, for example, it is

necessary for the human moral agent to predict the consequences,
social

happiness,

moral judgments.
one's

personal

say, which would

commitments

result from acting on particular

happiness

(or misery, for that matter) is on the same
Clearly this

is

incorrect.

One's

and scruples play an essential part in one's moral judgment

making, and if the view we have described above were true,
no room for moral commitment.

there would

Put in practical terms, one's commit-

ment to one's child, say, and not the expansion of social happiness
all,

total

This view is problematical because it is assuming that

footing with everyone else's.

be

is

is at the heart of one's moral judgment making.

for

Put differently,

one does not kill one's child to increase the general happiness of society because one is committed to the child
to increasing social
person's

concerns

position which

happiness.

It is

the child takes precedence
simply not true

that each

are on an equal footing with everyone else's -- a

the formalist

impartiality theories

leads one to.

Wi 11 i ams writes:
Instead of thinking in a rational and systematic way either about
utilities or the value of human life, the relevance of the people at
risk being present, and so forth, the presence of the people at risk
may just have its effect . . . for most human purposes (sub specie
aeternitatis) is not a good species to view the world under . . .
very often we just act as a possibly confused result of the situation in which we are engaged. That, I suspect, is very often an
exceedingly good thing.130
130 sernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," p. 118.
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What we find in Williams• moral philosophy, then, is an attack on
all

three of the

Dissertation.

philosophical

positions we are examining in this

It is an attack on all three for the same reason,

namely

they do not recognize the place of commitment in making moral judgments.
Formalism, with its views of impartiality and universalizability,
abstraction

in moral reasoning taking precedence over moral commitment.

In content theories, such as various brands
happiness

has

takes

of utilitarianism,

precedence over one's moral commitments.

And virtue

ethics is suspect because there is seemingly no room for moral
ment within its theoretical geography.

social

commit-

CHAPTER V
MODELS OF MORAL JUDGMENT MAKING
What we will

attempt to do is to develop various philosophical

models of moral judgment making based on elements of moral
and analyzed

discussed

in

this

Dissertation.

The attempt,

reviewing several prospective models, will be to develop an
model"

of moral

judgments
after

"integrated

judgment making -- one which responds to the defects

found in the various ethical perspectives explicated

in

the

Disserta-

tion.
It is recognized that there has been much philosophical ink spilled
over analyzing and explicating the differences between a theory and a
model.

It

is also

recognized

that there is not complete agreement

within the philosophical community over what constitutes a theory,
relationship

between facts

and theory construction,

the

or the precise

differences among various types of theories, to name a few issues.
Even though this is the case, it
remarks

is

necessary to

supply a few

explicating why the term "model" is being used in this chapter.

To delve into an extensive philosophical examination on

the

nature of

theory or model construction is beyond the limits of this Dissertation.
The term "model," though, is being used in the sense of a design which
is held before one for guidance.
84

A model is a heuristic device -- the
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details are filled in when a particular issue is presented whose articulation, illumination or resolution can be benefitted by viewing

the

issue through the particular model.
It

is certainly the case that the models to be presented are com-

prised of various theories.

And to define 11 model 11 in the above manner

suggests a particular theory of model building.
as being used in this Dissertation, differs
theory

But the term 11 theory, 11

from a model

in that a

is a more elaborate set of general or abstract concepts and

principles which are useful when reflecting on the characteristics of
moral

judgments.

A theory consists of a set(s) of propositions .linked

together in various ways.

A theory is an abstract, consistent perspec-

tive by which to view moral judgments, for instance.
A model,

on the other hand, is more heuristic.

model, for instance, is a device for
particular moral
steps of the model.

A teleological

illuminating and

resolving a

dilemma which would benefit from analysis through the
Teleology as a theory, though,

is an elaborately

worked out system or perspective on moral judgment making, among other
areas.

With this distinction in mind, let us proceed

in the task of

illustrating and explicating the various models of moral judgment making.

1)

The philosophical justification for this move is twofold:
have

shown

We

that the three major contenders for assessing the nature of

what constitutes a moral judgment are

philosophically

inadequate and

suspect; and 2) there is no logical reason why the various approaches to
moral judgment making cannot (in principle) be combined.

It

is

fully
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realized

that

eclecticism in philosophy is viewed with suspicion -- as

being intellectually bankrupt.

So this move needs to be philosophically

justified, to be argued for.
We

are assuming that the main question of this Dissertation,

are the characteristics of a moral judgment?"
question

11

What

is

the

nature

synonymous with the question
ing? 11

11

is

synonymous with

11

What
the

of a mora 1 judgment?, 11 which is a1so

What is the nature of moral judgment mak-

Undoubtedly some genius could take this assumption apart, but it

is the basis of the entire Dissertation.
three

If it is found that these are

separate or different questions, the Dissertation does not have a

foundation to stand on. Thus, we are arguing that the attempt to develop
an

"integrative model"

of moral

judgment making is not a different

enterprise from trying to ascertain what the characteristics of a moral
judgment are.

At

the

very

least these three questions are so inter-

related as to be indistinguishable.
William K. Frankena has argued that if one is viewing morality from
a duty-perspective,

it

is

account of ethical

virtue that is dependent on a duty-based
judgment. 131 Frankena, unlike Macintyre, gives

priority to duty.

Philippa Foot retorts to such views as Frankena's by

noting:
131 wi 11 i am K. Frankena, "The Concept of Mora 1ity, 11

Perspectives on
Morality: Essays of William K. Frankena, Ed. Kenneth Goodpaster (Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), pp. 125-132.
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The man who acts charitably out of a sense of duty is not to be
undervalued, but . it is the spontaneous contributor who most shows
virtue and therefore to the other that most moral worth is attributed.132
Using different terms than we have in the Dissertation, why cannot
a rights theory of ethical judgment (a content approach), a virtue based
theory and a duty based theory (formalism) be combined in a philosophically creative and acceptable manner?

If not,

each theory seems

to

stand apart from the others; to have no relationship with the others; to
even be mutually exclusive.
Wittgensteinian moral

One winds up, in the final analysis, with a

universe where the rules (and so on) even within

one area of ethical discourse do not translate to other areas of ethical
discourse:

an ethical

world of moral monads, perhaps at best merely

bumping into one another.
Based on the work of Tom Beauchamp, 133 then, the following will

be

an attempt at such an integration, with the intent of developing various
models of moral judgment making
will,

in

the final

(with

philosophical

rationale)

arguments of this chapter, lead to an

model 11 of moral judgment making.

11

which

integrated

Beauchamp writes:

I am not contending that actions are virtues or that virtue standards are logically equivalent to moral principles.
But I am
maintaining the following: principle and virtue standards are both
132 Philippa Foot, Virtue and Vices,
Virtues and Vices and Other
Essa}s in Moral Philosophy. (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1978 ' p. 18.
133 Tom Beauchamp, What s So Special About the Virtues?
Virtues
and Medicine: Ex lorations in the Character of Medicine,
Ed.
Earl
Shelp..
Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985 , p. 307.
11

11

11

1

11

,
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like general action guides; virtues in the context of ordinary
morality are dispositions to do what persons ought to do as a matter
of duty and principles of duty express our convictions about the
proper character that persons should cultivate.134
What

Beauchamp contends

corresponding virtue:
ness;

is

that every principle of duty has a

for instance, fidelity corresponds

to faithful-

beneficence to benevolence.

In a similar fashion he argues that
rights, duties and virtues are correlative. He notes that 11 one person's
right entails

the duty of another to refrain from interfering or to
provide some benefit, and any duty similarly entails a right. 11135
To give but one example:
duty which

respect for privacy

correlates to respectfulness for privacy, which is a virtue

standard, and guarantees the right of privacy,
general

is a principle of

a human

The

claim being made, then, is that virtues, principles and rights

are correlative because they are all ends of the moral life.
to

right.

At times,

guarantee the moral life will be lived well, a theory of duty may be

superior to a virtue standard -- at other times
case.

this may not be the

Beauchamp and Childress put the point this way:

Whether one takes the utilitarian or deontological standpoint no
doubt makes a great deal of difference at many points in the moral
life and in moral reflection and justification. Nevertheless, the
differences can easily be overemphasized. In fact, we find that
many (not all) forms of rule utilitarianism and rule deontology lead
to identical rules and actions. It is possible from both
134 Ibid., p. 311.
135 Ibid., p. 311.

89
utilitarian and deontological standpoints to defend the same rules
(such as truth telling and confidentiality) and to assign them
roughly the same weight.136
The point, then, is not that different ethical theories can be collapsed into each other -- that REALLY, when one gets down
are saying the same thing.

to

it,

they

For example, no matter how much one tries to

integrate rule utilitarianism and rule deontology there will always be a
difference
tions.

in

the

starting points of their respective ethical reflec-

Rule utilitarianism will consistently insist that the principle

of utility justifies all

other principles and rules, while the rule

deontologist will argue that some principles and rules can be justified
apart from the

principle of utility (the principle of autonomy, say).

And this theoretical difference between them does
tance for ethical judgment making.

have

immense

impor-

As Beauchamp and Childress continue:

. . . we shall see throughout this volume that utilitarians tend to
support a wide variety of types of research involving human subjects
on grounds of social benefits of the research. Deontologists, by
contrast, tend to be skeptical of much of this research on grounds
of its actual or potential violation of the principles of autonomy
and respect for persons.137
What we are trying to argue, though, is that at times a utilitarian
(act or rule) approach is more amenable to ethical judgment making (and
in this sense offers proper characteristics of a moral judgment in this
136 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Princi les of Biomedical
Ethics, Second Edition.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1983 ,
p. 41.
137 Ibid., p. 41.
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context), while at another time a deontological approach (act or rule)
is

preferable.

have an

11

And the only way to determine which to emphasize is to

integrated model

11

which includes both, among other possibili-

ties.
Thus, we mention

Beauchamp's attempted

integrative theory as a

backdrop (and philosophical justification) to our own.

We will be using

other terms than Beauchamp's, but our intent is the same as his,
to develop an
To

set

11

integrated model

the

stage,

of moral judgment making.

then, the first model which will be developed

will be a teleological one.
ethical

11

perspective will

The summary of the

ingredients of each

itself be integrated to a certain extent --

thus we will not quote extensive sources who adhered to these
in one form or another.

namely

positions

Some of that has been done previously; too much

emphasis on sources at this point would be counterproductive, as we are
attempting

to establish a gestalt of a particular ethical theory and
11

11

not a fully developed and argued for position.
The teleological approach
interpret

nature

purposefulness.
for ethical

is one

such attempt which

seeks

to

physical, human, social/political -- as exhibiting
Various forms of development are inherently purposeful,

judgment making is aimed at a specific end or result.

differently, nature (or God) has a plan inherent in

it which

Put

displays

purposefulness.
This

does

not

imply,

though, that the individual is always con-

scious of the goal or pattern; rather, it means that a rational
can

discern

person

a pattern or end to her ethical behavior -- she realizes
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that a particular goal is inherent in her ethical judgment making,

say.

This purposefulness unites discreet acts into a pattern of meaning which
helps the individual make appropriate moral judgments.
this,

teleological

tions.

In accomplishing

explanations are vehicles for answering 11 Why 11 ques-

When asked why an individual judged

11

X11 to be ethically approp-

riate, a teleologist may respond by discussing the purposefulness of the
action.

Self-realization, for instance, is one such accomplishment when

a person judges and acts in a purposeful manner.
Aristotle

points

to this kind of case when he says that a doctor

does not deliberate about whether to cure his patient: he takes the end
for granted and asks how it may be achieved. 138 Of course, there is a
difficulty with Aristotle's position.
instance,

should

the

In cases of terminal illness, for

physician always act so as to cure the patient?

Are there times when the physician should act to ensure

the patient's

death -- by withdrawing nourishment, say?
Such questions

do not

have simple answers, and the teleological

ethical position does not help in some ethical conflict situations, like
the one just mentioned.

This shows, again, that problems about the

138 Discussed in Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Philosophy: History & Problems, Third Edition. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1983), pp.
78-104.
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starting point of moral reasoning encompass much uncertainty and controversy, so that in itself any particular moral system leaves much

to

be desired.
The

following

model

suggests a teleological approach to ethical

judgment making:
Teleological Model
a)

Problem perception

b)

List of alternatives in light of specific goals

c)

For each alternative
Assign a value or degree of completion to the goal
achieved:
1.

+++

2.
3.

++

4.

5. Etc.
d)

Select the alternative(s) with the highest value for maximizing the
goal.
Take the concern with ethical policy making within a corporate en-

tity.

The President of the corporation perceives that there are

some

serious moral issues that are in need of consideration.

One alternative

is to deal with the issues through Presidential

Another is

fiat.

to

form a Corporate Ethics Council to determine the telos of the corporate
entity.

Each alternative will

(probably).

However,

for

produce some degree of satisfaction

the sake of argument, let us say the second
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alternative is chosen because it is in
goals,

among other factors.

keeping with

the corporations

In brief, this is but one description of

the functioning of the Teleological Model.
A second approach to ethical judgment making
deontology.

Deontological

To be consistent, we will

approach

ethics

is

sometimes

termed

and formalism are somewhat related.

use the

term "formalist approach."

This

stresses one's duty, as opposed to teleology which emphasizes

goal realization and consistency.
teleological

perspective,

Formalism is not a rejection of the

but it does have a different moral starting

place and emphasis, as has been previously noted

although the aim of

the formalist is to do whatever is right even if it interferes with some
goal or end.
Formalists make moral judgments out of ethical principle.
ing to formalism,

the

rightness of an ethical judgment follows from

principle and not from the consequences of the act.
thus,

emphasizes

Accord-

the ethical

actor's

The formalist,

intention -- for a judgment is

proper if an individual intends to do her duty which is based on moral
principle.
A formalist asks

the following kinds of questions:

necessary feature(s) of the ethical life?
possible?"

"What makes an

"What is the
ethical

life

The formalist insists that judging in conformity with ethi-

cal principle (doing one's duty)

is

the

necessary feature of moral

judgment making.
Put a bit differently, formalism, especially of the Kantian brand,
seems to have four sorts of arguments regarding the constituents ·of an
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acceptable moral

judgment

(and of the good life).

They are:

1)

The

insistence that the ideal life consists in submission to a certain will
or command expressed in universal imperatives that hold for everyone and
which admit of no exceptions; 2) the insistence that, unlike
cal

imperatives,

moral

imperatives

are

unconditional, containing no

exceptions, that is, binding regardless of the
riding

all

others with which

hypotheti-

they may

consequences

and over-

come into conflict; 3)

the

argument that the will to which a morally good person submits is not the
will

of another,

but her own will, insofar as she is rational; and 4)

the stress on certain values,

such

as

autonomy,

dignity

and

self-

respect.139 A model of the formalist approach follows:
Formalistic Model
Problem perception
List alternatives
a.
b.
Compare
c.

List rules or principles
a.
b.
c.

139 Philippa Foot brings this out well in "Morality as a System of
Categorical Imperatives." Philosophical Review, 81 (1972), pp. 305-316.
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One alternative consistent with rules
One right action

Several alternatives
consistent with rules

Alternative
consistent with
one rule, conflicts with
another

Several right actions

Appeal to higher
level rule to
so 1ve conflict
A third approach to moral judgment making is a utilitarian model (a
form of teleology).

The utilitarian agrees with the teleologist that

happiness is the appropriate end of ethical judgment.
that

there

ality, say.

is

But she disagrees

a universal concept of happiness, such as human ration-

Rather, most utilitarians (of the act or rule sort) develop

a psychological theory of human happiness -- a life in which pleasure is
emphasized over pain.
people usually

This is based on the

psychological

seek pleasure and attempt to avoid pain.

judgment making has a proper emphasis if moral

act

11

X11

truism that
Thus, moral
produces the

greatest amount of happiness for people -- community benefit is important here.
not sensual

Likewise, the happiness the utilitarian is concerned with is
pleasure, but individual and community growth and develop-

ment.
Against the formalists, for the utilitarian (of the act or rule
sort)

good

intentions do not constitute a criterion for defining moral

judgment; rather, like with Stephen Toulmin, the consequences of the act
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have essential importance.

One can imagine, for instance, a person who

has the greatest of intentions, but whose judgment (and subsequent act)
decreases

human

happiness.

And, if the interests of individuals come

into conflict, only those interests which further the
eral

happiness

have ethical

import.

community's gen-

For example, fetal research and

experimentation which could lead to better health care and prevention of
disease among children would be morally justifiable because the consequence is positive.

The seeking of the general good is the meaning of

moral judgment making for the utilitarian.
Usually act-utilitarianism and
guished by ethicists.
in

this

rule-utilitarianism are distin-

We have not done so in using utilitarian language

Dissertation with complete consistency.

Following our intent,

we want to argue that there is a sense in which the distinction

is

not

helpful and a sense in which it can be collapsed.
Act-utilitarianism is the view that it is individual acts which are
to be judged according to their utility, that is, the acts which ought
to

be done are those which yield the greatest utility.

anism (in its most common forms, at least) is

the

Rule utilitari-

view that the act

which ought to be done is that which is prescribed by the set of principles which has its highest "acceptance-utility," that is, those accepted
in society will generally yield the greatest utility.
Since,

it is assumed,

the

general acceptance of a set of moral

principles which includes most of the well-established ones would
better consequences

than

the

have

acceptance of the principle that each

individual act should be judged on grounds of its own

utility without
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bringing

in any other principles,

this would be a way of giving a

rule-utilitarian justification for conforming to only well-established,
accepted social principles.
But, as G. E. Moore argued, this move to rule-utilitarianism is not
necessary.
moral

He suggested that, given the pitfalls and uncertainties

in

judgment making (a point we have been hinting at throughout this

Dissertation), a careful act-utilitarianism can argue that the probability of acting

for

the best is maximized by sticking to the wellestablished principles. 140 Such a philosophy will be both an act and a
rule-utilitarian, so that the distinction between them collapses.
The following model of ethical judgment making, then, is based on a
utilitarian perspective:
Utilitarian Model
Problem perception
List alternatives
Make choice
Frame an ethical statement
a.

Conditions

b.

Who

c.

What

140 G.
E.
Moore,
Principia Ethica.
University Press, 1966), p, 162.

(Cambridge:

Cambridge
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For each consequence
Scan list of personal values
Compare consequences with values
Examine this in light of the greatest good
Make decision after possible consequences are decided
A fourth approach to moral judgment making we will term personalism
virtue.

This is the most difficult to explain because it is composed of

various

strains

of thought

(which we cannot delve into here as this

would take us too far afield from our present task).

We need to stress

the fact that the description of these various models is both tentative
and oversimplistic.

But their development is also for

heuristic

pur-

poses.
The
growth.

personalism-virtue model

is concerned with individual moral

This approach can be traced to both Aristotle, who we mentioned

when discussing virtue ethics, and Immanuel Kant's "Treat each person as
an end in himself and not as a means."

Thus,

the personalism-virtue

model is individually oriented; its basic concern is with moral judgment
making at the individual level as it reflects community development.
This approach includes five presuppositions.
1)

Human beings are unique.

They are:

This means that human persons

are worth-

while because they are human persons; and they should be valued as
such.
2)

Humans are virtuous beings, that is
usually the desire)

to

they

have the capacity

lead a life of virtue.

(and

Put differently,

following the lead of virtue ethics, proper moral judgment making is
directly related to the virtue characteristics of the moral actor.
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3)

Humans

are

relational beings.

We are called in the very depths of

our being to be in relationship with others -- we cannot escape this
fact,

and

such

relationality defines

us

situationally as moral

actors.
4)

A human is a unified person.
separations as

This means

that

body/soul, mind/spirit/ and

such

philosophical

individual/community

morality need to be questioned.
5)

A human is a transcendent being.

We

transcend ourselves merely

through the act of using language (we go out of ourselves to others,
that is).

The Personalism-Virtue Model will now be expanded:

Personalism-Virtue Model
Problem perception
List alternatives in light of the individual's characteristics:
a.

Uniqueness

b.

Virtuousness

c.

Relationality

d.

Unification

e.

Transcendence

For each alternative a value should be assessed regarding its contribution to furthering a-e above.
Select the alternative(s) which considers most fully the development of a-e above.
Moral judgment making which would flow from this approach would
emphasize the virtue characteristics and positive qualities by which
members of the community relate with one another.

For instance, if the
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issue were

policy development within an institutional setting of some

kind, such policies would acknowledge the full meaning of human
ness.

They would seek to foster the

individuals

person-

unique, virtue-

oriented, relational, unified and transcendent characteristics.
Going into more depth regarding these various models is not needed,
for we are

not attempting to explicate or to philosophically analyze

various ethical positions at this

point in the

Dissertation.

The

attempt is to reflect on the philosophical analysis already accomplished
in order to develop a more comprehensive model of moral judgment making.
Up

to this point we have noted that there are different ways to philo-

sophically analyze moral judgment making -- and the attempt
the

characteristics of moral

to examine

judgments is a necessary aspect of this

process, so it has been argued.
The next move, then, will be to develop an
moral

judgment making.

But before

several steps needs to be taken.

"integrated model"

of

such a model can be applicable,

They include the following, and their

inclusion depicts various elements from the other models developed in
this chapter, as well as from the ethical theories explicated and philosophically analyzed in this Dissertation:
1)

Goals

need

to be established which are made in light of the nature

and purpose of whatever is under consideration.
2)

The goals should be prioritized, for they cannot all be achieved at
the same time.

The same value judgments involved in setting goals

are generally present in setting priorities.
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3)

Individuals need to be aware of the precariousness of some ethical
issues.

As someone once said, 11 A problem to be a problem must BE a

problem." Many minute, contradictory issues may be
moral agent.
4)

If there

is

present to the

She needs to identify and prioritize these.
time,

next comes

the step of gathering data.

Mere

speculation cannot replace the gathering of data upon which to

have

a basis for moral judgment making (as much as Hare would disagree).
5)

Alternatives need to be devised and ethically evaluated.
this is not to suggest that all alternatives
weight.

perfectly clear,

making.

the same moral

Rather, we are supposing that moral judgment making is (in

part) a dialectical process.
were

have

Of course

For instance, if life/death decisions

there would be no need for moral judgment

Best as we humans try, there seems to usually be an element

of mystery and uncertainty involved in moral judgment making.
6)

The

next step is to identify RELEVANT alternatives.

Then each al-

ternative should be evaluated in light of the individual's goal(s).
This

is the content aspect of the process.

can be eliminated due
necessary

to

alternatives:

Yet some alternatives

to a "limiting factor, 11

realistically evaluate factors

that

is,

it

is

that limit certain

this may mean that some judgments can be eliminated

because they are not realistic.
7)

After identifying all

relevant alternatives, the next step is to

examine and weigh the value of each alternative in
gorical
model.

ethical

principles.

terms of cate-

This is the formalistic aspect of the
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8)

At this point it is necessary to ask two questions:
short-term consequence (s)

of the

long-term consequence(s)? 11

Some alternatives

because they are

process? 1111

In

inappropriate.

and,

"What is
"What

the

is the

can be disregarded

sifting out the short and

long-term consequence(s) of the process, an individual is using both
a content criterion and the personalism-virtue model
judgment making.

The next step

is

to

of moral

compare and contrast the

consequences.
9)

Next the

individual

should examine

consequences in light of her goals.

the short-term and long-term

At times a short-term effect

may have to be sacrificed because of its long-term consequence.
10)

At this

stage the

individual

should be able to assess the best

alternative in light of the following:
a.

Formalistic considerations

b.

An assessment of content aspects

c.

A realization of her virtue level

d.

Analysis of consequences of various sorts (a content aspect)

e.

The use of appropriate ethical

principles

(a formalistic

emphasis).
f.

The development of personhood
consideration) in relationship to

(a

personalist-virtue ethics

community harmonization

content aspect).
The foll owing diagram is suggestive of such an

11

Integrated Model. 11•.

Integrated Model
Problem perception

List categorical ethical

(a
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Identification of alternatives

principles

a.

a.

b.

b.

c.

Compare

c.

Evaluation of alternative(s) in light of purpose
List consequences
a.

Immediate (short-range)

b.

Long-range

For each consequence relating to the individual, the following need to
be considered:
a.

The individual's uniqueness

b.

Virtue characteristics

c.

Relationality

d.

Unification

e.

Transcendence

Again, compare consequences in light of goals
Select the appropriate alternative
What we are stressing, then, is that the various theories of moral
judgment making and theories which proposed characteristics of moral
judgments we have considered in this

Dissertation need not be seen

merely in isolation from one another.

To do so is to view philosophy as

a reductionist activity -- whereas integration has classically been one
of philosophy's main functions.

It is hoped that even if the details of

the project of this Dissertation are
that the
argued.

theoretical

arguments

somewhat unclear or inaccurate,

and analysis are well developed and
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Thus, to summarize:

For one philosopher to appeal to utility and

another to appeal to the principle of autonomy does make a great theoretical difference in their respective theories.

But it may not make

much difference at the level of moral judgments.

Likewise, it may be

impossible to have a TOTALLY adequate system of morality,

that

is,

a

system of morality which resolves every competing ethical claim -- after
all moral principles and moral rules do conflict (beneficence and autonomy, for instance).

Alan Donagan argues this point when he writes:

In all the vast and imposing body of work on consequentialist moral
theories, there are many sketches and projects for constructing
moral systems. But none have been constructed.141
This

is not as odd as it may first appear:

after all if different

ethical theories initiate reflection from different standpoints, isn't
141 Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality.
Chicago Press, 1977), p. 191.

(Chicago:

University of
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it

logical

that theory

11

X11 may leave out what theory 11 Y11 emphasizes?

Beauchamp and Childress prefer to term ethical
"perspectives" to avoid this exact dilemma.

theories

or systems

They argue:

It is quite possible that the moral life is so diverse that no
theory can stand up to the completeness test even though a theory
may capture some specific domain of that life, such as our conception of 'justice' or our conception of 'the public interest.'
Yet each of these broad ethical theories that we have examined
arguably offer a valuable perspective from which to view morality .142
This

is

precisely what we have been arguing here -- and precisely

what philosophically justifies our attempt at an "integrated model."
Let us, then, further explicate an "integrated model" by reference
to Bernard Williams's concept of "integrity, 11143 for Williams's analysis
of integrity will aid the argument for the necessity of an
model."

Put differently,

thus

"integrated

far a critic might respond that the

"integrated model" does not integrate anything.
The contention of this Dissertation, then, is not merely a negative
one:

even though the three theories of what constitutes moral judgment

making were found philosophically inadequate, it does
nothing

philosophically

not follow

that

(and practically) interesting and important is

part and parcel of the long philosophical tradition which has considered
the nature of moral judgment making.

Williams's notion of "integrity,"

then, will help us clarify why the "integrated model" integrates.
142 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical
Ethics, Second Edition, p. 43.
143 Bernard Williams,
"Persons, Character and Morality," The
Identity of Persons, Ed. Amelle Rorty.
(Berkeley:
University ()f
California Press, 1976), p. 201.
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Williams argues

that the

11

ground projects 11 in a person's life are

what constitutes her character, that is,

one's

projects differentiate

her from others.

The 11 ground projects," those which constitute a person's reason for being, are integral to one's identity. 144 And since
integrity for Williams

is

tied to one's moral wholeness and is that

virtue which unifies one's value system, a loss of integrity
mount to a loss

is tanta-

of one's moral identity, a loss of one's very moral

self.
Williams, then, is not merely arguing that one's
and commitments are integral to one's moral identity.

11

ground projects 11
He is noting that

such concepts as universality and impartiality, and other formalist
utilitarian aspects of moral

and

judgment making, precisely because they

reject, or certainly de-emphasize,

the

importance of one's

11

ground

projects 11

and commitments as a basis for the moral life, destroy the
sense of what it means to be a moral being. 145
To be a moral agent, according to this view, means, in part, to let

one's

"ground projects" and commitments take precedence over universal-

izing one's moral judgment, being
reasoning,

impartial

in one's mode of moral

or considering the consequences of one's moral judgment mak-

ing -- at least in many moral situations.

Williams's

has much in common with Kohlberg's at this point.

view,

obviously,

Kohlberg's Stage 6

144 Ibid., p. 201.
145 Bernard Williams, 11 Moral Luck," Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, Supp. Vol. 1 (1976), pp. 115-135.
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individual makes moral judgments based on her "self-accepted moral principles.11146 Williams, though, is saying something a little stronger, as
he would apparently disagree with Kohlberg on the importance of universal principles of justice.
What,

though, is integrative about all this?

Is not Williams pre-

cisely philosophically attacking both formalist and content theories
moral

judgment making, leaving personal choice and dedication to indi-

vidual projects and commitments the hallmarks of a true moral
It

of

is

judgment?

not known how Williams would respond to the above interpretation

of his philosophy of moral judgment making, but the argument will

be

extended to suggest that Williams' notion of integrity is integrative in
the senses necessary for the "integrated model" to
integrates

the formalist,

judgment making; and, 2)

integrate:

1)

It

content and virtue ethics theories of moral

it integrates moral judgment making with moral

experience.
1)

For Williams to emphasize the importance of integrity based on

one's acting out of "ground projects" and commitments is
him arguing

that there is an integral relationship between one's moral

character or virtue formation and moral
one's

tantamount to

judgment making.

integrity is to lose one's moral identity, even.

To

violate

It is integrity

which binds together one's sense of being a moral self and one's process
of moral judgment making.
146 Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement
(Cambridge,
of the Platonic View," Moral Education, Ed. T. Sizer.
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 58.
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Williams's
also.

theory of moral judgment making has a content aspect,

The concept of one's "ground project" is a non-moral concept, for

instance.

The

justification for

saying

that 11 X11 is good in a moral

sense is if 11 X11 is a satisfactory way of organizing one's moral
Such a characteristic is, obviously, like

11

life.

the moral point of view, 11 a

content aspect of moral judgment making.
Finally, Williams's theory has a formalist
11

forma1 is t"

is meant that

aspect to

if by

there is a sense of mora 1 judgment making

which includes a commitment to moral principles.
obligation.

it,

What Williams

seems

Take the idea of moral

to be saying is that if 11 X11 is the

conventionally moral thing to do, and if one's integrity connotes that
she would be unfaithful

to her freely accepted 11 ground projects" and

commitments if she judged that
obligation,

11

X11 is the moral thing to do,

her moral

that which justifies both her moral life and her saying 11 X

is the morally correct thing to do, 11 would transcend "the conventional
thing to do."
Put differently,

as with Kohlberg, Williams is arguing that self-

accepted moral commitments form the basis of
making.

These moral

commitments,

11

proper 11

moral

judgment

then, even if not universalizable,

impartial and prescriptive, are formal principles and "ground projects"
out of which one's moral judgment making operates.
2)

Williams' theory of moral judgment making is integrative in the

sense that it ties together one's sense of being a moral self and moral
experience.

It has already been noted that integrity forms the basis of

one's moral identity, and to violate that integrity is to precisely be
alienated from one's moral ground of being.

Yet Williams also says:
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.projects, in a normally socialized individual, have in good
part been formed within, and formed by dispositions which constitute
a commitment to morality.147
Williams moral

universe, then, is not a throwback to the do your
11

own thing generation.

11

moral

Put another way, moral experience itself seems to

experience.

It is integrity which forms

have tied to it the concept of commitment.
Wallace,

among others, have argued.

This is

and unifies

one's

certainly the way

Integrity, then, is the very inte-

gration of the concept of moral experience with one's sense of being a
moral self.
Williams'
one lens

philosophical

by which to view the

one's moral

reflections
11

on integrity, therefore, are

integrated model. 11

Without such a model

experience may be forever out of touch with one's moral

judgment making ability.
to consistently make

One may, in all honesty and sincerity, attempt
impartial

moral judgments, for example, without

noticing that at times impartiality is violating her integrity
which makes her a moral self within a moral community.
147 Bernard Williams,

11

Persons, Character and Morality," p. 208.

that

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We

need

Dissertation.

to be clear about what
We are not

judgment-making are

saying

is

NOT being argued in this

that the various models of moral

reducible to each other.

It is not being implied

that the models are insufficiently structured so as to
autonomous

standing.

All

that

assertion from a philosophical

is

never have any

being argued (and this is a huge

standpoint)

is

a soft thesis

that

regarding some ethical issues deontology, say, is a better approach than
teleology.

But even this soft thesis is controversial.

Then there is the strong thesis that
serve

an

"integrated model"

can

the best of all possible worlds, that is, the "integrated model,"

since it includes the major ethical systems• input, can be of use in ANY
ethical dilemma where judgment is necessary.

By saying it can be of use

does not mean that at certain times teleology, for instance,
better way to go.

may be a

We are arguing, rather, that since the "integrated

model" includes input from the various ethical perspectives and systems
one can

certainly emphasize the appropriate ethical perspective or

system while admitting that other ethical perspectives or systems
RELEVANCE.
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have
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Following the

lead of Robert Nozick let us help clarify the soft

thesis further by centering in on deontology and teleology.
use

Rawls'

definition of the two, which Nozick uses.

meant an ethical stance which
independent of the

good.

defines what
By

And let us

By deontology is

is ethically appropriate

teleology is meant that ethical stance

whereby appropriate ethical judgment and behavior

is

directed

toward

the achievement of a good, be it utilitarianism, consequentialism or any
ethical

theory which

prescribes

the

content of appropriate moral

judgment-making.
Nozick states our soft thesis in the following manner:
Peaceful coexistence in a division of labor.
For one sort of
problem or choice a deontological theory is correct, while for
another, a teleological one is.148
This

proposition

is not determining which situations are which.

only a recognition that ethical judgment making situations
deontological

and teleological

elements

inherent

certain issues which demand an emphasis of moral

in

It is

have both

them, although

principle application

may mean

that a deontological theory is emphasized while those issues

demanding

a teleological

principle application may mean

that

a

teleological theory is emphasized.
Our hard position can be further elucidated by Nozick's following
remarks:
148 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations.
Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 494.

(Cambridge,

Mass.:
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Another way to try to give each of deontology and teleology its due
is . . . by specifying different sources for each.149
By "different sources
that

is,

11

Nozick has in mind the foundations moral

the motivation for

action,

being moral in the first place.

It can

either come from an ethical pull, a moral claim on us exerted by
others, 11150 or an ethical push, the manner in which 11 ! am best off
behaving. 11151 As he says:
11

The deep and long-standing ethical conflict between deontology and
teleology, each having strong intuitive force, would be neatly and
satisfyingly explained if, for example, one view was the appropriate
structuring of the ethical pull while the other was the appropriate
structuring for the ethical push.152
He puts this differently when he writes:
Deontological concerns can thus be mirrored or presented naturally
within a teleological framework concerned with maximizing the
good.153
What we are arguing by the development of the "integrated model
teleological

11

is that

concerns, likewise, can be mirrored or presented naturally

within a deontological framework

concerned with

using

and assessing

moral principles.
Perhaps

agreement between teleologists and deontologists can more

readily been seen at the level of moral principles or rules,

that

both ethical camps emphasize that moral judgment requires various
149 Ibi d., p. 495.
l 50ibi d. , p. 451.
151 Ibid., p. 495.
152 Ibid., p.
495.
153 Ibid., p. 498.

is,
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rules. 154 Without principles or rules of some sort, be it the principle
of utility or that of autonomy, moral judgment-making would lose one of
its main

ingredients.

principle or rule
decision.

has

And certainly it is the case that the type of
serious

implications

ethical

If the principle is individual autonomy, such decisions as

"informed suicide 11 make ethical sense.
personal

for the actual

or social

utility,

If the

principle

is

that of

"informed suicide" might make different

ethical sense.
To agree that principles or rules are
ethical

judgment-making to occur,

practical level.
level

in

intelligent

then, is not to assert much at the

This agreement, though, is helpful at the

noticing areas

deontology.

necessary for

of common

concern between

theoretical

teleology and

And since, perhaps, the most interesting ethical issues are

those in which there is an ethical conflict (between good vs. evil, good
vs. good and evil vs. evil), there needs to be some model
moral judgments.
won't do.

A simple teleological vs. ontological ethical universe

Based upon such appeals, we submit the "integrated model. 11

We have argued, then,
question

for making

11

that the three contenders for answering the

What constitutes an ethical judgment? (formalism, the content

approach and the virtue ethics
problematic.

perspective)

are

philosophically

Our next move was to offer a soft position whereby it was

recognized that for certain ethical judgments teleology offered a better
154 This point is developed by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress,
Princi les of Biomedical Ethics, Second Edition.
(New York: Oxford
University Press, 1983 , p. 43.
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beginning; and for others deontology did

the

incompleteness of the soft position and
"integrated model" of moral

same.

We

noticed

the

thus moved to argue for an

judgment making.

The

success of this

endeavor is left to better minds to evaluate.
It

is

the

"integrated model"

which

attempts

various moral and non-moral, or utilitarian,
individuals

declare themselves

to explicate the

structures

through which

to be moral judgment-makers.

model is a wholistic challenge to those who take their moral

Such a
universe

and their participation in a moral community seriously.
In

considering

judgment-making,
philosophical

appropriate

then,

it

traditions

is

and

not

enough

to

critique

various

-- which creates a strong negative tone,

perhaps, in the first few chapters of this
enough to argue

relevant aspects of moral

Dissertation.

Nor is

it

that moral judgments, based on specific philosophical

theories of moral judgment-making, are more appropriate in certain moral
situations while not appropriate in others.
This

latter approach

analysis which merely points
philosophical

theories

is

out theoretical

of moral

because it does admit that moral
judgment-making.

And,

preferable to a negative philosophical
problems with

judgment-making.
philosophy has

It

specific

is preferable

relevance for moral

it is preferable because it can point to issues

and areas of agreement -- as well as serve as a heuristic guide to moral
judgment-making.
But the development of an "integrated model" is crucial.
crucial for at least two reasons:

1)

Without such

It is

a philosophically
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defensible model, theories of moral judgment-making become like a monad
of Leibniz -- without any connection to anything else in moral theory or
in moral experience.

2)

the very heart of moral

An "integrated model" recognizes the person at
judgment-making, while also

recognizing

the

importance of noting the relationship between moral principles to moral
judgment-making, the need to realistically analyze the

content aspects

of such moral judgment-making and the utmost necessity of examining the
moral characteristics of a moral judgment-maker.
Put differently, moral principles are
specific

moral

commitments.

Moral

advocated

by

judgment-making

persons with
is

done

by

individuals who are conscious of "higher" ends, be they self-development
or social happiness.

The "integrated model ,

11

then, is an attempt to be

attentive to all of the above; and a future work is promised which will
be

solely devoted to philosophically fleshing out theoretical and prac-

tical aspects of the "integrated model" which are beyond
this Dissertation.

the

scope of
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